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Abstract 
 
 
 
Polarization in the modern Congress creates an atmosphere in which the liberal 
to conservative ideological structure dominates political conflict. Members of 
Congress (MCs) vote principally based on their own ideological preferences with 
relative stability, and there is evidence that preferences are diverging between 
the two major parties. But in a system of district-based representation, MCs must 
consider the implications of their voting behavior on their electoral fortunes. In a 
geographically vast multicultural and multiethnic democracy like the United 
States, regional variety in economic incentives and cultural perspectives means 
that each legislator faces unique concerns. In previous eras, regional disputes like 
slavery, “free silver,” or civil rights provided the dominant divisions within 
parties. In the contemporary Congress, marked by its evident and growing 
polarization, can issue politics still provide an important dimension in 
congressional decision-making? Or should ideological models that incorporate 
issue politics guide our understanding? This research considers issue voting in 
an era of polarization and explores the impact of these diverse interests on policy 
voting in Congress. The results suggest that dimensionality, or the appearance of 
multiple dimensions of preferences beyond the typical liberal-conservative 
continuum, are evident in the modern Congress. In looking at salient policy issue 
 iv 
areas like environmental, immigration and abortion policy, there is evidence of a 
voting calculus that incorporates the concerns of district economic and cultural 
interests. Since some MCs may prioritize their primary constituency above 
general election interests, these issue dimensions can be suppressed. These 
findings help shape an understanding of voting behavior within Congress and 
our understanding of representation in American democracy.  
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Polarization, Ideology and Issue Politics 
 
 
 
In 1840, remarking on the state of political parties in the United States, Alexis de 
Tocqueville wrote: “In America, the two parties were in agreement on most 
essential points… as a consequence, neither of them effected the existence of a 
great number of individuals ([1840] 2003:204).” Woodrow Wilson echoed this 
argument 45 years later he found America lacking strong parties “essential for 
the formation of an active and effective public opinion ([1885] 1925:186-1870).” In 
1950, the American Political Science Association (APSA) issued a report arguing 
that political parties needed to become stronger and more distinguished from 
one another to provide a “broader political base (16).” For over a century, major 
political commentators argued that the absence of distinct and divided parties 
threatened the very foundations of American democracy. These observers 
desired a more divided political system, with so-called responsible parties taking 
consistently opposing issue positions so that voters could easily distinguish 
between their choices.  
The modern U.S. Congress provides an excellent example of being careful 
what you wish for. The Pew Research Center declared recently, “political 
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polarization is the defining feature of early 21st century American politics, both 
among the public and elected officials (Doherty 2014).” The divisions within 
American political opinion are no longer marked by the historic regional splits 
that slavery, bimetallism, and civil rights created in the public and in Congress. 
The 114th Congress (2015-2016) will feature only three Democratic senators from 
the South (Nelson D-FL; Kaine and Warner D-VA) and two Republicans from 
New England (Snowe R-ME; Ayotte R-NH). In 1995, when the 104th Senate took 
its seats, there were seven Republican senators in New England and ten Southern 
Democrats. In that Congress, nine states in the New England and Southern 
regions split their Senate delegations. In the 114th, just four states in these regions 
had split delegations, including two with an independent senator.  
Polarization can most simply be defined as the division of political 
attitudes into liberal and conservative camps (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 
2006, 3). This definition is sufficient and covers the modern usage of journalists, 
congressional scholars, and politicians. But it may be more useful to distinguish 
polarization as a process from polarization as a state of affairs (DiMaggio 1996). 
If we take as a starting point the 1950 report from the APSA Committee on 
Political Parties, there is wide agreement that the Congress has undergone 
decades of polarization (process), creating an atmosphere where polarization 
(the state of affairs) is now the “defining feature” of the political landscape.  
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Tocqueville, Wilson, and the APSA committee on parties were no doubt 
influenced by a reverence for the parliamentary discipline of European 
democracies (Polsby and Schickler 2002). The APSA report centers around 
“responsible” parties, both the governing and the opposition. In this current 
polarized environment, where parties and the public are thoroughly divided into 
“liberals” and “conservatives,” why does Congress not function like a party or 
coalition dominated parliamentary system? In the Congresses that saw unified 
control of both houses of Congress and the Presidency (107th, 108th, 109th, 111th) 
did these polarized coalitions develop the dominant party government that the 
APSA report and others expected? Unfortunately, depending on your point of 
view, ideologically divided political parties and unified control did not usher in 
an era of productive lawmaking. Instead legislative gridlock retained its status as 
a “common but not constant” feature of the U.S. Congress (Krehbiel 1998, 5).  
Voting Behavior in Congress: Ideology and Beyond 
 
The calculus made in voting decisions of members of Congress (MCs) has been a 
subject of rigorous scholarly debate. The importance of parties, constituents, and 
ideology have all been cited as key influences on the roll call votes for MCs 
(Miller and Stokes 1963, Clausen 1973, Mayhew 1974, Fenno 1978, Poole and 
Daniels 1985, Cox and McCubbins 2005, Smith 2007, Lee 2009). Yet political 
scientists and commentators alike have come to focus on ideology as measured 
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on a single dimension from liberal to conservative as the dominant model of 
legislative preferences (Converse 1964, Poole and Rosenthal 1997). Though there 
is opposition to this concept (see Lee 2009, Crespin and Rhode 2010), the 
categorization of legislative preferences seems to be a single street with a camp 
on the left, and on the right (Hotelling 1929).  
The current generation of congressional scholars has produced a model of 
legislative behavior that looks much different than early studies of congressional 
decision-making. A focus on the role of ideology has replaced an emphasis on 
the agency and individual calculus of MCs. Studies of the individual’s role in 
Congress produced a model that stressed economic calculus and reelection goals. 
These studies moved from a focus on a large number of influences and 
institutions that affect voting (Kingdon 1981, originally 1969) to Mayhew’s (1974) 
conception of MCs as singularly focused on electoral goals. Studies of MCs 
outside of the Capitol demonstrated how they interacted in their district (Fenno 
1978), how entrepreneurial legislators created “enterprises” to increase their 
power and influence (Loomis 1990), and the how constituencies influenced 
voting behavior (Miller and Stokes 1963). Constituency influences have been 
demonstrated in studies of the 1824 Congress (Carson and Engstrom 2005) and 
other political development studies (Schickler 2001). But not all constituency 
influence is equal. Fenno (1978) stressed the importance of personal and 
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reelection constituencies, while others have conceptualized a “sub-constituency” 
or “prospective constituency” that focused on the constituency of swing voters 
and interests as the most influential for MCs (Bishin 2000). For these scholars, 
there is an individual calculus to voting beyond ideology. The constituency a MC 
comes from, and the electoral considerations that environment creates is crucial. 
 Others reject this individual based model of congressional decision 
making in favor of an ideology-centered approach. Krehbiel (1993) compared 
constituent variables and found that ADA scores were more effective at 
accounting for roll-call votes. This focus on general policy orientation or 
“ideology” as a model for legislative behavior has been formalized by creating 
ideal points for the preferences of legislators on a one or two dimensional 
structure of ideology (Poole and Daniels 1985, Poole and Rosenthal 1997 & 2005) 
and a theory of lawmaking that stresses preferences on a one-dimensional scale 
(Krehbiel 1998). Ideology, usually conceived as a consistent pattern of 
preferences held by legislators, is a troublesome idea for other congressional 
scholars. As Lee (2009) points out, the term ideology is not used in any article on 
Congress before 1940. It is hard to distinguish “ideology” from party or regional 
loyalty (Heckman and Snyder Jr. 1997, Lee 2009). Quantitative methods may 
place legislators on ideal points, however these techniques inherently capture 
party and district level concerns as endogenous features of ideology (Maltzman 
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and Smith 1994). For these authors, a conception of ideology as the only 
theoretically important influence on roll call voting, as argued by Krehbiel (1998), 
is flawed. 
Clausen (1973) provides an alternative model of congressional decision-
making and contends that MCs do have consistent preferences, but they vary by 
the issue area considered.  This argument centers on the “law of categorization,” 
which proposes that legislators, like the everyday voter, organize their political 
preferences based on the category of issue being discussed. Within these distinct 
categories, MC’s decision making can be consistent because the areas offer 
distinct ideological positions. For instance, two MCs who categorize themselves 
as “conservative” may have differing opinions on agricultural assistance, civil 
liberties, and foreign involvement because of the distinct nature of those issue 
arenas. 
 Clausen focused on five categories of policy: government management, 
social welfare, civil liberties, international involvement and agricultural 
assistance. But Clausen studied the period from 1953-1964, and he notes that 
these need not be the same dimension over time, but some if not all are likely to 
reappear (Clausen 1973, 84-85). Recent studies show that these distinct issue 
areas can be seen in later Congresses. Crespin and Rohde (2010) find distinct 
voting differences in the areas of military, foreign affairs and agriculture in 
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appropriations voting. Talbert and Potoski (2002) used co-sponsoring data and 
found distinct preferences on as many as four dimensions. Even within closely 
related issues, like rural development and agriculture, distinct policy domains 
can be shown (Hurwitz et al. 2001). Later policy debates like women’s issues can 
also be seen as distinct issue arenas (Norton 1999). Some argue that these 
competing issue areas show where the influence of parties is lessened by 
regional, individual or constituent influences (Miller and Stokes 1963, Shipan 
and Lowry 2001).  
The unidimensional model has become almost an assumption in the 
modern period, as “liberal” and “conservative” approaches to the role of 
government characterize the beliefs of an entire country. Poole and Rosenthal 
(1997) in their seminal work on Congress expand the conception of preferences 
slightly to include a second dimension that is time sensitive, which accounts for 
the important, but divisive, issues of that legislative period. Classic second-
dimension issues include slavery, civil rights, and bimetallism. All of these 
dimensions were regionally important issues that divided parties. They find that 
85% of voting can be explained by accounting for preferences in these two 
dimensions (Poole and Rosenthal 1997, 27), earlier research had a similar finding 
of 80% using the first dimension and 87% on the second (Poole and Daniels 
1985). The first dimension ideological score created by this proceedure is now a 
 8 
central feature of studies on congressional voting and ideology, while the second 
dimension score is largely ignored. As Smith notes, the “spatial theorist does not 
worry about why legislators hold the policy positions they do and so treats the 
policy positions as exogenously determined preferences” (2007, 91).  
Others who take a view similar to Clausen find these unidimensional 
conceptions lacking. Those concerned with specific policy positions prefer a 
multidimensional view of congressional preferences (Koford 1989; Maltzman 
and Smith 1994; Norton 1999; Snyder and Groseclose 2001; Crespin and Rhode 
2010; Dougherty et al 2014). One key argument against a single dimension of 
preferences stresses that scaling techniques used in spatial models can identify 
dimensions but not disaggregate other endogenous components being captured 
(Smith 2007). This argument stresses that ideological first-dimension scores are 
the results of a statistical analysis of roll call votes rather than a categorization of 
votes by a true measure of ideology. Poole and Roosenthal describe this point 
when they say dimensional findings are “blind .. to the substance of the vote” 
(1997, 7). A second key argument mounted by Koford suggests that while one 
dimension may be clearly identified, other dimensions can be seen throughout 
the legislative process and they must be explained as well (1989, 960). Ideological 
scores based only on roll call voting ignore the complexity of policy issue 
dimensions that can arise in legislative proposals and committee deliberation.   
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Poole and Rosenthal challenge Clausen’s policy-context dependent 
decision rule in their book, using the 95th Congress as an example to test 
Clausen’s model against their own model that uses a procedure called 
NOMINATE to create ideological scores for legislators in two dimensions (1997, 
54-55 & 233; Carroll et al. 2011). In their defense of a two-dimensional structure 
of preferences, they often miscategorize the nature of Clausen’s argument. While 
they find that Clausen’s policy areas fail to generate a separate spatial dimension, 
they ignore the much longer time horizon used by Clausen, as well as his 
contention that the policy dimensions he found may be more specific to his 
period of study. More importantly, these schools of thought conflict in their 
goals. Clausen’s goal is to describe voting calculus and decisions made in 
Congress. Distinctively different in aim, Poole and Rosenthal work to achieve 
ideological scores to predict outcomes and generate effective classifications.         
Finally, Poole and Rosenthal find that their model outperforms any 
constituency-based model. This should not be surprising, as the NOMINATE 
procedure inherently capture endogenous features of preferences, like 
constituency influences, yet they ignore the nuance of which constituency is 
effecting voting behavior (Fenno 1978; Bishin 2000). Voting on issues like 
abortion and agriculture may matter to specific parts of a personal or primary 
constituency due to cultural or district economic interests. Finally, the technique 
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used by Poole and Rosenthal may “outperform” other models, but statistical 
explanatory power is not always equivalent to theoretical and conceptual 
explanatory power. There is utility in the use of ideological voting scores, but 
reverting to this assumption in all cases neglects the nuance and layers used by 
legislators in their voting decisions.  
Political Culture and the “American Mosaic” 
In a diverse, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural democracy, a single structure of 
preferences seems unlikely to be universal. Polarized politics in the United States 
may create an environment in which most issues are filtered through a partisan 
or ideological lens. One might expect that debates over agricultural subsidies, 
immigration, or abortion will vary in their contentiousness and consensus across 
the communities in the United States. Some of this variation is due to economic 
interests—you may well prefer subsidies if you or your community is on the 
receiving end. Yet some of this variation will be the result of the cultural 
distinctiveness of the region as a result of migration patterns, religious 
development, education or other factors.  
 The work of Daniel Elazar (1994) on political cultures spawned a great 
deal of interest and research since its original formulation in the 1960s. In short, 
Elazar’s claim is that a federalist system of political development has created 
distinct patterns of belief about political action and the role of government. This 
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tripartite categorization defines cultures as being “traditionalistic,” “moralistic,” 
or “individualistic.” Traditionalistic cultures prefer maintenance of the standing 
moral and political order as view political action and advocacy as the realm of 
elites. Moralistic cultures believe that government can cure the wrongs in society 
through proactive policy decisions and believe in mass political participation. 
Finally, individualistic cultures focus on individual rationality and action; 
political action is meant for the good of individuals and governmental action is 
the result of those aims, rather than maintaining social order or promoting good 
policy. To overuse a phrase that will be abundant in this volume, the work has 
been polarizing among political scientists. The chief benefit of this categorization 
is its ability to explain a great number of things: party system development, 
variations in state policies, different local political institutions, and mass policy 
attitudes to name a few. Given this utility, political culture has instead become a 
catchall conception that has meant too many things to too many researchers. 
Unlike many theoretical models in modern political science, it has little to no 
empirical basis, no strict definitions, and no universal operationalization.  
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Figure 1.1 Elazar’s Political Cultures 
 
Researchers have employed Elazar’s conception in a variety of research 
with interesting claims. While a complete review of all of the uses of culture (i.e. 
Wildavsky 1985) and political culture is beyond the scope of this review, there 
have been some interesting findings. Perhaps the best-known recent work 
examines how state political culture accounts for variation in statehouse 
liberalism (Erikson, Wright and McIver 1993). Others have found its relationship 
with party competition within states (Morgan and Watson 1991), animal rights 
policy (Lutz and Lutz 2011) and its relationship with diversity in states (Hero 
1998).  
Despite troublesome aspects with its operationalization and 
quantification, the significant findings on the impact of political culture, either in 
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Elazar’s conception or in Lieske’s (1993; 2010) work on regional subcultures, have 
been demonstrated on both attitudes and policy outcomes. It is possible that 
political culture is a variable substituted for a variety of racial, social, and 
political attitudes (see Hero 1998). Yet this condensation may be helpful in 
understanding complex interactions.  
In this research, political culture will be utilized as a measure of the 
variation in citizen attitudes about government across the United States. Even if 
one has concerns with the operationalization of political culture, few would 
argue that the attitudes towards political action and outcomes are the same in 
Amarillo, Anchorage, and Anaheim, even if they elect representatives of the 
same party. Elazar’s categorization is used here to show how cultural and 
political values, not just simply economic interests, show variability across states 
and create complicated, constituency-centered voting decisions for MCs. 
Outline of the Book 
 
In the chapters that follow I describe how policy issues continue to divide parties 
within Congress and add dimensions to voting decisions that are absent, 
disputed, or dismissed in the dominant models of congressional action. This 
research is modest in its goals and does not purport to offer the same type of all-
encompassing theory of political parties or congressional action that are 
described in the following pages. The aim of this research is to provide evidence 
 14 
of the nuanced political realities of the U.S. Congress in a polarized era that are 
distinct from the theoretical expectations of the leading theories.  
In support of this goal, I will offer a few observations and then elaborate 
on those observations through looking at roll call voting behavior in both the 
House and Senate. Through the data and analysis presented in these pages, the 
following positions will be argued: 
 Even in an era dominated by liberal-conservative ideological debates, 
the diversity of cultural and economic interests of legislative districts 
in American society create additional dimensions of preferences that 
MCs must consider. 
 
 As agents of multiple principals, MCs cannot base their roll-call voting 
calculus purely on their own ideology. Rather, the concerns of multiple 
constituencies are incorporated. Policy issue dimensions create 
opportunities for activists, primary voters, and general election 
constituencies to influence roll-call voting behavior.  
 
 The combination of persistent dimensionality of the roll call agenda 
and conflicting principals results in individual congressional behavior 
that emphasizes risk-avoidance and symbolic action on policy issues.  
 
These positions provide answers to many pressing questions and debates within 
in the literature on Congress. The analysis and research presented here is new, 
but many of the arguments made are the product of hypotheses, theories and 
data collected by other scholars.  
 Chapter Two takes a systematic look at dimensionality in the roll call 
voting record in the House of Representatives from 1953-2002. This long time 
horizon allows for a comparison of dimensionality between an era when 
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congressional observers agreed that Civil Rights provided an extra dimension of 
preferences and the modern polarized era. The data show that cultural and 
regional issues like agricultural policy, gun rights, the environment, and abortion 
display dimensional patterns similar to civil rights issues. A change in the nature 
of procedural issue voting is also discovered, which suggests strategic behavior 
on some, but not all, of these dimensional issues.  
 Chapter Three expands on the findings from Chapter Two and 
investigates environmental and immigration policy voting in the Senate from the 
perspective of single votes, rather than the entirety of the roll call record. While 
some votes may be best explained by partisan or ideological competition, others 
display evidence of constituency representation of either culture or economic 
interests. On votes like biodiesel subsides, ideology takes a back seat to state 
industries and interest group behavior. For immigration voting, senators from 
traditionalistic states or with smaller Latino or foreign-born populations are 
shown to be more likely to cast anti-immigrant roll call votes. This chapter shows 
how a policy-centered approach often produces a more nuanced view of 
representation than looking at the entirety of the voting record. 
 Chapter Four explores the impact of multiple constituencies on voting 
behavior in the House of Representatives. Utilizing the 2006 Congressional 
Election Study (Stone 2010), this chapter examines the influence of primary voter 
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ideological extremism on environmental voting behavior. For Republican 
representatives, a very conservative primary constituency may mean few or no 
environmentally friendly votes, whereas for Democrats the primary voters had a 
slight but not statistically significant impact on environmental voting. But when 
compared with the general election constituency, the opposite finding was true. 
Democrats’ environmental scores, as judged by the (LCV) of Conservation 
Voters, varied significantly in relation to the average presidential voteshare, 
while Republicans did not. This finding speaks to the issues representatives face 
when dealing with multiple principals. Primary constituencies may suppress the 
role for an environmental dimension to voting, furthering the appearance of an 
entirely unidimensional structure. 
 Chapter Five provides an investigation into abortion policy voting in the 
Senate. If, as the previous chapters propose, the combination of 1) multiple 
principals and 2) geographic economic or cultural bases for representation 
provide a mechanism that leads MCs to consider dimensions of preferences 
beyond the traditional liberal-conservative scale, issues like abortion may be 
particularly difficult. In this chapter traditionalistic states, median party support, 
and issue advocates (measured by abortion protest activity) are shown to relate 
to the likelihood of anti-abortion policy voting. But, a detailed look at policy 
proposals and floor speeches on these amendments reveal symbolic action, 
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rather than substantive legislative activity. Often, these acts of political theatre 
are aimed at these same “subconstituencies.” 
The final chapter provides a conclusion and epilogue to the various 
analyses presented here. In considering the 2014 Agriculture Act, or “Farm Bill,” 
this chapter explores the future of issue voting and its relationship to both 
gridlock and the congressional agenda. Using the idea of “herestetics” (Riker 
1984) this chapter explains how dimensionality should continue to decline as a 
feature of the roll call record yet will always be an important aspect of 
congressional representation and the roll call record. 
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2 
 
 
The Persistence of Dimensionality in the Congressional Agenda1 
 
 
 
During consideration of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, the 
landmark health care legislation of Obama’s first term, House Speaker Nancy 
Pelosi (D-CA) encountered a roadblock.  Speaker Pelosi needed to 218 votes out 
of her 255 member Democratic caucus to pass the legislation. Standing in the 
Speaker’s path was a group of 40 dissident Democratic members who banded 
together to oppose consideration of the bill due to a possible loophole in the 
legislation that could funnel taxpayer money to provide abortions (MacGillis 
2009). With only 215 Democratic votes, the bill could not proceed. The Speaker 
was forced to consider three separate amendments by Democratic members who 
offered compromises on the question of abortion funding. Rep. Brad Ellsworth 
(D-IN), a recipient of the lowest possible rating from Planned Parenthood Action 
Fund for support of reproductive issues, offered one proposal that allowed 
private contractors to process abortion claims and prohibit health care exchanges 
from restricting access to plans covering the procedure. Rep. Lois Capps (D-CA), 
a staunch pro-choice activist, proposed removing all abortion language from the 
reform plan to prevent any growth or reduction in abortion coverage. 
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Congressman Bart Stupak (D-MI) and Congressman Joseph Pitts (R-PA) 
proposed the most restrictive proposed amendment on access and funding 
possibilities for abortions. After negotiations, and despite more “liberal” 
amendments being proposed, Speaker Pelosi was forced to allow consideration 
of a slightly modified Stupak-Pitts amendment. It passed with 64 Democratic 
yeas and became part of the House version of the legislation.  
 Issues votes like those on the Stupak-Pitts amendment provide an 
important challenge to those scholars who focus on a unidimensional model of 
congressional politics. Some Democrats voting for this amendment had 
ideological scores more liberal than that of President Obama. For example, two 
of those liberal supporters were committee chairmen Dave Obey (D-WI) of 
Appropriations and Jim Oberstar (D-WI) of Transportation and Infrastructure. 
These liberal, pro-life Democrats from the upper Midwest pushed for changes to 
the bill on the question of abortion, yet were strong sponsors of the goal of the 
legislation. The actions of Rep. Stupak and the pro-life Democrats who forced a 
vote on abortion funding in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act tell 
an important story about the role of issues outside of the traditional liberal-to-
conservative spectrum. In a Washington Post op-ed Congressman Stupak 
explained: “I and other pro-life Democrats are pleased that we were able to hold 
true to our principles and vote for a bill that is pro-life at every stage of life, and 
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that provides 32 million Americans with access to high quality, affordable health 
care” (Stupak 2010). The preferences of these Democrats had two distinct 
components: a traditional liberal to conservative dimension on the role of 
government in assuring access to health care, and a second dimension on the 
issue of abortion.  
Theories of party government argue that parties will use the amendment 
process to move the ideological character of the bill to the party median, rather 
than the chamber median (Cox and McCubbins 2005). In the case of abortion in 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, the most conservative 
amendment was the only one considered on the floor, and was supported in the 
roll call by only 27% of the Democratic Caucus. Members of the party leadership 
like Appropriations Chairman Obey abandoned the goals of President Obama 
and Speaker Pelosi and supported a different policy on the question of abortion, 
showing how salient issue dimensions can rise above party loyalty and 
traditional ideology. In this chapter, I explore evidence of the importance of the 
ideology beyond the first dimension on roll call voting in the U.S. House of 
Representatives.  
Evaluating Dimensionality 
This research will use data from the Public Institutions and Public Choice (PIPC) 
database (Rhode 2004), combined with Poole and Rosenthal’s DW -NOMINATE 
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roll call data (Carroll et al 2011) to examine issue areas in the 83rd to the 95th 
Congress and the 96th to the 107th Congress. The 95th Congress (1977-78) was 
chosen as a dividing line for a number of reasons. Poole and Rosenthal argue that 
the 95th Congress was an example of a unidimensional Congress with the largest 
number of roll-call votes, further they argue that “from the late 1970s onward, 
roll call voting again became largely a matter of positioning on a single liberal/ 
conservative” dimension (1997, 5). Other congressional scholars have described 
this period in Congress as “between legislative eras” (Loomis 1990, 15). Dividing 
the dataset equally also fits Clausen’s argument about the long time horizon of 
salient policy domains. The roll call votes in this database are limited compared 
to the universe of roll-call votes in this period, as unanimous votes were not 
scaled in the DW-NOMINATE procedure and were dropped from analysis.   
The dependent variable considered is the absolute value of the cutting line 
created in a two dimensional space to classify voting on the roll call. This 
procedure produces a line that correctly classifies a mean of 86% of votes in the 
pre-96th Congress, and 89% of votes in the post-96th Congress. The cut line 
produced is an angle separating the yeas and nays in the space, and the resulting 
angle can explain much about the dimensionality of the vote. Consider a vote 
with a 90-degree cutting angle; its vertical position means that the horizontal, 
liberal-conservative ideology is the important dimension in classifying votes. 
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Alternatively, consider a horizontal line with slope of zero degrees, running 
parallel or on top of the traditional first dimension. This cutting angle would 
exclusively use the second dimension to classify votes. Using this observation, 
the “steepness” of the cutting line explains how much leverage the second 
dimension has at classifying votes. The absolute value of the cutting line 
measures the steepness of each cutting angle as it removes the impact of negative 
or positively sloped cutting angles. 
Issue Areas and Independent Variables 
This research tests Clausen’s theory of policy context decision rule by examining 
how different policy areas affect the steepness of the cutting line produced by the 
D-W NOMINATE classification scheme. Beyond original issues considered by 
Clausen, additional areas are added to this analysis that reflect the categorization 
component of Clausen’s theory. Issue area codes for gun control and abortion are 
often seen as areas of independence for Republicans and Democrats alike, and 
they provide areas for position taking to reach primary or “prospective” 
constituencies (Fenno 1978, Bishin 2000). 
Rural Development and Agriculture: These areas have been cited as the source of 
the extra dimensional preferences in many Congresses (Poole and Daniels 1985; 
Poole and Rosenthal 1997). Hurwitz et al (2001) found that agriculture and rural 
space is multi-dimensional, even within legislation. Hansen (1991) found 
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significant impacts for the farm lobby on Congress in his research. Additionally, 
these areas could capture regional and constituent concerns. Rural development 
is a classification of appropriations voting, whereas the variable for agriculture 
includes subsidies and price supports, food stamps, farm credit and other non-
appropriations related agriculture bills. As a regional influence, these issues 
should decrease the steepness of the cutting lines. 
Energy and Environment: Similar to the regional nature of rural voting, Talbert 
and Potoski (2002) find an environmental dimension to congressional voting. 
Additionally, issues in this policy area could have constituent, regional, or 
interest group influences. This category includes votes on oil exploration, energy 
subsidies, pollution, National Parks, and vehicle emissions among others. These 
votes are hypothesized to decrease steepness of the cutting line as regional or 
district economic concerns drive voting, rather than a liberal to conservative 
ideology. 
Foreign Policy: International involvement was one of Clausen’s examples of a 
distinct policy domain (1973). Other researchers have found foreign policy to be 
an important dimension of congressional decision-making (Talbert and Potoski 
2002; Crespin and Rhode 2010). Alternatively, Poole and Daniels found foreign 
policy was best captured by the first dimension (1985). Following the theory of 
Elazar (1994), and considering the uneven displacement of military facilities, 
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varying regional and member perspectives on foreign involvement should lead 
to a negative coefficient. 
Abortion: The political culture of regions can influence attitudes towards issue of 
family planning and abortion (Elazar 1994). This could be varying religious 
traditions of each region leading to “traditionalistic” political cultures. Norton 
(1999) also argues that gender issues produce dimensionality. Finally, abortion 
politics may be salient to many primary constituencies. Based on these theories, 
votes in this category should hypothetically decrease the steepness of the cutting 
angle showing a negative coefficient. Absent an ideal measure, I use roll call 
votes within the health and human services category that include the 
classifications of “family planning” and “abortion.” 
Crime and Criminal Justice: Civil liberties made Clausen’s list of distinct issue 
areas, and this category of votes in the PIPC classification model fits most closely 
with the civil liberties arena outline by Clausen. This includes votes on 
pornography, drug control, criminal procedure, law enforcement assistance and 
others. Like the abortion vote variable, this category includes many social issues 
that have been found to be part of the second dimension content.  
Gun Control: Gun control is also included in the crime and criminal justice 
category, but an additional variable controls for it. Preferences on gun rights 
legislation would theoretically be difficult to classify on a liberal-conservative 
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scale under traditional definitions. Additionally, gun rights voters may be a 
significant component of a “prospective” constituency as outlined by Bishin 
(2000). Gun control issues may divide parties as well as urban and rural 
legislators; they should affect the cutting angle. 
Civil Rights: Poole and Rosenthal find that civil rights was the main issue 
making up the second dimension in the House for the 81st, 86th, 87th, 90th, 92nd, 
94th, 96th, and 97th Congresses (1997, 51). Classification success should increase for 
civil rights issues if they are captured by the second dimension. In the PIPC 
conception, this includes pay equity, age discrimination, gay rights, busing, as 
well the historical components usually classified as “civil rights” issues. 
Including this variable in the model also helps test for model robustness. If civil 
rights is a key, if not the only, component of the second dimension for a 
significant era in congressional history, there should be a large effect for civil 
rights legislation on the angle of the cutting line.  
Party and Control Variables: Three additional variables were added to the 
models. First, a variable for which legislative session the vote is taken in is 
included. Members may vote differently on policy areas that could impact their 
electoral chances, especially as the election approaches. Second, dummy 
variables were added to note whether a roll call was on final passage or on an 
amendment vote. We should expect a more active second dimension on 
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amendment voting because such votes often split parties thus, they reduce the 
impact of a unidimensional classification structure.  
Baseline and Other Issues: The issues areas used as independent variables were 
selected as theoretically viable second dimension issues. These issues will be 
considered in opposition to a baseline category of votes not represented by these 
policy areas. The baseline category includes issues that fit a “liberal” and 
“conservative” issue dimension properly. These categories include votes on 
issues like tax policy, national defense contracting, financial service regulation, 
welfare, Social Security, labor relations, and public broadcasting. A full coding 
scheme is found in Appendix One. 
Results and Discussion 
The results of the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models can be found in 
Table 2.1. The data show modest support for issue-based dimensionality in 
voting behavior in Congress during the two eras. Poole and Rosenthal cited civil 
rights as the issue captured by the second dimension during much of the period 
of votes pooled to make the pre-96th model. Per that finding, the cutting angle for 
civil rights issues was about 14 degrees less steep than a typical issue with a low 
standard error of a less than 2 degrees. This result is helpful to confirm the model 
design.  
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Other issue variables in the pre-96th Congress show that roll call voting on 
rural, agriculture, foreign policy, gun rights, and environmental policies had a 
statistically significant reduction in the steepness, and therefore the 
unidimensional structure of the votes. Roll call votes on amendments also 
showed significant effects on the cutting line, but only by a few degrees.  
The post-96th Congress models found results similar to the model for the 
previous era. Rural development, agriculture, gun rights, and energy issues all 
reduced the steepness of the cutting line, in line with the previous period. The 
magnitude of the effect varied in some cases, as rural issues’ effect on steepness 
lessened in the post-96th model. Perhaps the most interesting change was the lack 
of significance for civil rights issues, which were replaced by the impact of 
abortion issues, which became the second highest coefficient next to gun rights 
issues.  There were positive and significant coefficients for crime/criminal justice 
issues, and final passage votes, suggesting these votes were more 
unidimensional than the others considered.  
The variable for the session of the roll call was significant and negative. 
Roll calls that took place in the second session of a Congress, on average, were 
less clearly classified by the unidimensional structure. This provides some 
support for an electoral focus for both individual MCs and parties. As the 
biennial election nears, members of Congress are more likely to depart from their 
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first dimension ideological preferences.  If the first dimension captures party 
loyalty (Poole and Rosenthal 1997, 35), this result may indicate that individual 
concerns may trump party loyalty as the election looms.  
Table 2.1: Regression of the Absolute Value of the Cutting Line Angle 
      Pre-96th Congress f Post-96th Congress 
(Intercept) 
 
64.295* 
(0.878) 
66.618* 
(0.578) 
Session 
 
    -1.939* 
      (0.494) 
-0.823* 
 (0.346) 
Rural     -16.109* 
     (2.419) 
-7.028* 
(1.266) 
Agriculture     -18.564* 
     (1.280) 
-12.931* 
(1.431) 
Foreign Policy     -6.298 
       (0.938) 
0.835 
(0.693) 
Abortion        2.476 
       (7.972) 
-18.137* 
(2.037) 
Energy and Environment      -4.107* 
     (0.791) 
-3.405* 
 (0.677) 
Gun Control 
 
     -22.007* 
      (8.287) 
-23.473* 
(0.265) 
Crime and Justice      2.307 
      (2.228) 
3.366* 
(1.153) 
Civil Rights     -14.295* 
    (1.465) 
0.757 
(1.571) 
Amendment      -2.567* 
    (0.652) 
-2.701 
(0.396) 
Final Passage     -0.432 
     (0.608) 
0.778* 
(0.332) 
N 6320 12127 
 Note: Standard Errors in parentheses, * = p ≤ 0.05 
 
Figure 2.1 graphically demonstrates the changes between issue areas and 
party control between the pre and post-96th Congress.  The Zelig program 
(Kosuke, King and Lau 2007) was used to conduct a 10,000-vote simulation based 
on the models specified in Table 2.1; these graphs show the expected cut line of 
simulated votes in each issue area with a 95% confidence interval. The horizontal 
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Figure 2.1: Simulated Absolute Value of Final Passage Vote Cut Line by Issue Area: 
Pre and Post 96th Congress 
 
line shown is the median of the absolute cut line in each period. This line can be 
used for comparison to the average roll call vote. As is evident on the graph, 
there were very few roll call votes on abortion and gun rights issues in the pre-
96th Congresses, so the confidence interval shown is very large. The most striking 
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evidence from the figure is the change in the status of civil rights issues, and the 
rise of abortion issues on the second dimension. 
Statistical spatial modeling of roll call votes can produce a one-
dimensional ideology that allows for correct classification of a high percentage of 
votes. But the models presented here show that there is systematic 
underperformance in that approach when considering specific issue voting. 
These areas of underperformance are not fatal to the utility of ideology scores or 
the unidimensional model. In fact, these may actually help to illuminate features 
of congressional voting behavior and explain what is left unexplained from the 
unidimensional model.  
The Modern Congress and the Second Dimension 
The evidence presented in the previous section provides support that issue areas 
have had a systematic correlation with the performance of the unidimensional 
model in the modern Congress. The models investigated previously cover 10,241 
votes from 24 different congressional sessions, precluding the nuanced analysis 
required to judge the impact of these specific issue focuses in congressional 
voting. Looking at each Congress in the data set individually provides 
opportunities to see when these issues matter, and what effect they may have on 
dimensionality. 
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 Clausen found stability for his issue dimensions over time, arguing that 
MCs maintained a consistent categorization of these issues in their decisions, but 
not that these issue categorizations maintained importance in each Congress. In 
one chapter, he explores the importance of each of the issue categories on voting 
in the 91st Congress and finds that only 4 of the 5 issue dimensions are operating 
(1973, 77). The results presented in Table 1 show that issue dimensions, most of 
which Clausen used in his original analysis, have continued to be significant 
beyond his period of study. That is not to say that they have been important in 
every Congress but rather that there is evidence for the consistency of these issue 
dimensions over time. 
 To examine the importance of these issue areas within each Congress, 
subsets of data were created for individual Congresses in the post-96th era. Data 
again were combined from the same sources (Rhode 2004, Carroll et al. 2011). 
The dependent variable is again the steepness of the cutting line created in DW-
NOMINATE process as measured in the degrees. The number of scaled votes 
that were included in analysis varied from 518 in the 107th Congress to 1176 in 
the 104th. The results of these models are in Tables 2.2 and 2.3.   
 The models were specified to include every dichotomous variable for 
issue areas included previously, but in some Congresses these issues were not 
featured on any roll call vote as coded by the PIPC project (Rhode 2004). Where 
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no results are displayed, as with gun control issues in the 96-98th Congress, this is 
the result of no observations, not absence from the model. In the following 
analyses, each issue area will be considered individually.  
Rural Development: Rural development was a significant variable at lowering 
the steepness of the cutting angle in both periods examined previously. The 
results presented in these tables demonstrate that it has been an important issue 
area on the second dimension, but only for specific Congresses. Each significant 
coefficient for rural issues (103-105th, 107th Congresses) was in double digits, 
reaching a peak of an average 30 degree effect in the 104th Congress. But the 
intercept in the 104th Congress is 82, suggesting that most of the roll call votes in 
this session were more unidimensional.  
Agriculture: Agricultural assistance had statistical significance and high 
magnitude coefficients in a majority of the specific Congresses examined. When 
pooled, agriculture issues were associated with an on average reduction of 13 
degrees in the cutting line, yet in the 107th Congress the coefficient was over 
twice that estimate. For the 107th Congress, agriculture votes had an, on average, 
a change of 150% the standard deviation of the dependent variable. Looking at 
the error terms in the tables, the cases where the agriculture variable was not 
statistically significant may have been due to lack of observations.  
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Table 2.2: Regression of the Absolute Value of the Cutting Line Angle 
by Congress (96th to 101st) 
 96th 
1979-80 
97th 
1981-82 
98th  
1983-84 
99th  
1985-86 
100th  
1987-88 
101st     
1989-90 
Intercept 67.013* 
(2.449) 
44.088* 
(3.445) 
49.838* 
(2.858) 
55.203* 
(2.264) 
59.148* 
(2.281) 
56.530 
(2.356) 
Session -3.871* 
(1.331) 
1.771 
(1.906) 
0.080 
(1.720) 
3.299* 
(1.334) 
-0.994 
(1.352) 
1.409   
(1.364) 
Rural 9.343 
(8.665) 
13.086 
(7.716) 
13.397 
(7.992) 
-2.014 
(5.553) 
-8.164 
(10.379) 
3.445 
(7.353) 
Agriculture 2.066 
(4.009) 
-14.687* 
(5.070) 
5.990 
(4.681) 
-2.611 
(3.450) 
5.302 
(5.454) 
-20.990* 
(3.950) 
Foreign Policy 2.877 
(2.153) 
-2.590 
(4.092) 
1.112 
(2.979) 
1.119 
(2.026) 
3.005 
(2.355) 
0.361 
(2.304) 
Abortion -8.419 
(14.937) 
  -10.911 
(18.223) 
  
Energy & Environment -2.280 
(2.160) 
-1.532 
(3.772) 
-2.282 
(3.075) 
-7.145* 
(3.304) 
-3.273 
(2.547) 
1.059 
(2.443) 
Crime 1.959 
(5.065) 
25.458 
(17.133) 
9.183 
(6.968) 
2.388 
(5.152) 
0.407 
(3.331) 
0.640 
(3.850) 
Civil Rights 1.022 
(4.894 
7.274 
(8.158) 
4.608 
(6.953) 
4.755 
(5.314) 
8.415 
(4.350) 
8.347* 
(3.988) 
Gun Control  
 
  -18.749* 
(8.520) 
-28.031 
(18.160) 
-14.698 
(13.160) 
Amendment -1.446 
(1.656) 
8.157* 
(2.260) 
11.033* 
(2.054) 
3.632* 
(1.517) 
7.309* 
(1.538) 
4.512* 
(1.555) 
Final Passage 1.432 
(1.709) 
17.999* 
(2.351) 
17.700 
(2.179) 
8.336* 
(1.750) 
9.247* 
(1.691) 
8.265* 
(1.674) 
N 1067 679 792 777 771 752 
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses, * = p ≤ 0.05. 
 
Foreign Policy: The model presented in Table 2.1 show some influence for 
foreign policy issues on the cutting angle, yet it was low in magnitude. The 
coefficient showed only a one-fifth change in the standard deviation of the  
dependent variable. When looking at each Congress individually, presented in  
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Table 2.3: Regression of the Absolute Value of the Cutting Line Angle  
by Congress (102nd to 107th) 
 102nd 
1991-92 
103rd 
1993-94 
104th 
1995-96 
105th 
1997-98 
106th 
1999-00 
107th 
2000-01 
Intercept 61.923* 
(2.309) 
63.549* 
(1.921) 
82.014* 
(1.702) 
69.852* 
(1.958) 
64.472* 
(2.182) 
65.605 
(2.660) 
Session 0.579 
(1.289) 
-0.032 
(1.177) 
-5.769* 
(1.117) 
-0.509 
(1.204) 
1.014 
(1.261) 
0.193 
(1.654) 
Rural -10.293 
(5.568) 
11.264* 
(4.207) 
-29.875* 
(3.516) 
-16.209* 
(3.216) 
-3.435 
(3.105) 
-14.033* 
(5.384) 
Agriculture -20.672* 
(10.063) 
-22.235* 
(10.219) 
-22.132* 
(5.076) 
4.083 
(8.109) 
-26.271* 
(6.787) 
-27.775* 
(4.914) 
Foreign Policy 1.886 
(2.625) 
1.329 
(3.353) 
1.931 
(2.324) 
1.790 
(2.296) 
-3.143 
(3.943) 
-0.706 
(2.979) 
Abortion -14.140* 
(6.187) 
-8.403* 
(3.522) 
-28.832* 
(6.567) 
-25.496* 
(5.077) 
-22.997* 
(6.747) 
-31.023* 
(8.765) 
Energy & Environment -0.293 
(2.339) 
-2.290 
(2.141) 
-9.280* 
(2.157) 
-9.775* 
(2.596) 
-1.087 
(2.401) 
-12.393* 
(3.913) 
Crime 9.223* 
(4.352) 
7.611* 
(2.567) 
4.570 
(2.989) 
11.107* 
(3.917) 
-13.823 
(3.962) 
17.893 
(17.525) 
Civil Rights 7.454 
(4.697) 
 
 
-2.699 
(7.082) 
-23.242 
(18.055) 
-8.295 
(6.341) 
3.287 
(12.357) 
Gun Control -19.366* 
(7.810) 
-26.813* 
(7.629) 
-41.469* 
(12.598) 
 -10.023 
(5.551) 
 
 
Amendment -0.560 
(1.501) 
0.220 
(1.289) 
-11.703* 
(1.144) 
-7.900* 
(1.377) 
-5.246* 
(1.429) 
-1.424 
(1.805) 
Final Passage 3.749 
(1.594) 
5.901* 
(1.591) 
-3.414* 
(1.513) 
-2.485 
(1.596) 
2.165 
(1.587) 
2.742 
(2.018) 
N 780 969 1176 946 874 518 
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses, * = p ≤ 0.05 
 
Tables 2.2 and 2.3, these results seem to vanish. In no Congress was this issue 
area shown to affect the dimensionality of the vote. 
Abortion: The most interesting results presented in this model show the rise of 
abortion as a dimensional issue in Congress. The 96th-101st Congress show nearly 
no votes on abortion issues; in most cases they were dropped as a variable 
because no votes were classified in this issue area. From the 102nd -107th Congress 
roll call votes on abortion had a consistently flatter cutting angle than the other 
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issues considered. In the modern period abortion issues have not been 
unidimensional, but rather have the largest influence for the second dimension of 
the issues considered.  
Energy and Environment: Energy and environmental issues were sporadic in 
their impact on the dimensionality of roll call votes, only having significant 
effects in four of the twelve Congresses modeled. When they were significant, 
their coefficients were less than half that of other issue areas in the model.  
Crime: In all of the models, only four variables showed positive and significant 
effects on the steepness of the cutting line. Three of these cases were in the crime 
and criminal justice variable. Though the magnitude was less than other 
variables, this data suggests that votes on crime and criminal justice are 
explained by liberal to conservative ideology better than other issue areas.   
Civil Rights: The results in Table 2.1 showed that civil rights had not been an 
issue area with any leverage on the cutting angles of votes in the post-96th 
Congress. In only one Congress did the issue have a significant effect (p-
value=0.036). Given this data, it appears the civil rights dimension of voting in 
Congress has largely vanished to the extent that such votes are largely expressed 
on the first dimension. 
Gun Control: The largest coefficient in the post-96th Congress model in Table 2.1 
was found in the issue variable for gun policy. When we look at the level of each 
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Congress, we see that this reflected the impact of a few years of congressional 
work. In the 104th Congress the coefficient doubles the standard deviation of the 
dependent variable, representing the largest impact of the variables in the 
models in Tables 2.2 and 2.3. In the following 105th Congress there are no 
recorded votes coded as gun control issues, 21 votes in 106th, and no votes again 
in the 107th Congress. Within some years where gun control is on the agenda, we 
see the impact of dimensionality. But for many years, these issues are not on the 
agenda and therefore may produce a roll call record appears more 
unidimensional than the actual preferences of the members. 
Dimensionality in the “Contract with America” 
The evidence provided in the models in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 shows the changing 
dimensionality and coalitions of MCs on issue areas over time. As the data for 
gun control votes demonstrated, issues can emerge and disappear on the agenda 
and become a dominant feature of the agenda. It is useful to consider what this 
looks like within a Congress. Figure 2.2 shows these data graphically and 
provides the results of a 10,000 vote simulation based on the regression model 
for the 104th Congress (Kosuke, King and Lau 2007). The 104th Congress, the first 
term of Speaker Newt Gingrich and that of the “Contract with America,” was 
chosen because it has the highest number of cases, highest r² in relation to 
explaining the changes in the cutting line angles, and largest initial intercept of 
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82, meaning a mainly unidimensional Congress. A horizontal line was placed at 
the median cutting line of 72.15, the mean was 66, with a standard deviation of 
19.2. The bars in each issue area represent the 95% confidence intervals for each 
issue area. This figure can be compared with Figure 2.1, which displayed the 
simulation results for the pre and post 96th Congress. The low number of roll calls 
on many of the issue areas preclude an over focus on the results of this 
simulation. But the maximum 95% confidence interval for votes on rural 
development and abortion issues is one standard deviation “flatter” from the 
mean cutting line.  
Figure 2.2 : Simulated Absolute Value of Amendment Vote Cutting Angle by Issue Area:  
104th Congress (1995-96) 
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Agenda Setting and Dimensionality 
The literature on agenda setting provides theories as to why we should expect 
certain issues to become salient in any given time period. As with Clausen’s “law 
of categorization” these ideas are drawn from decision-making theories in 
psychology. Some individuals may pride themselves as multi-taskers, but 
cognitive processing is generally categorized by selective information and 
“bottlenecks” of attention (Baumgartner and Jones 2002, 16). This dynamic can 
also be described as serial, rather than parallel, processing where attention to 
issues is focused on a case by case, rather than multiple cases at once. For 
individuals, this is one way rational behavior is “bounded” or limited. While a 
useful model of individual and institutional behavior, bounded rationality 
should also allow for congressional capacities to consider multiple issues (for 
instance: Baumgartner and Gold 2002, 280-281). It may be more useful to think of 
serial processing in terms of attention levels in the institution, rather than in the 
individual level work. The issues on the second dimension historically were 
often the most salient issues of the time, and as such were a central focus of 
institutional attention. 
 Slavery, the coinage of silver, and civil rights have had their place on the 
congressional agenda, and will not be the subject of another congressional vote. 
Issues routinely hit the public agenda and then disappear. New agenda issues in 
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which parties have do not have a consistent positions create the possibility for 
specific issue dimensions to rise on the agenda. Rural issues, abortion, and gun 
control votes were almost nonexistent in Table 2.2, but they became some of the 
most significant contributors to the dimensionality of voting from 102nd-107th 
Congress. 
 The logic of Clausen’s law of categorization lies in the fact that legislators 
have general characterizations of issues that can be used to guide their decision 
making on specific roll call votes. It is likely that positions on gun control and 
abortion of legislators have not changed, but the agenda did. As issue 
dimensions become relevant, or disappear as the case may be, the importance of 
issue areas or a second dimension may change. As the models from the Reagan 
era (97-100th) show, issue areas played no role in affecting dimensionality. 
Clausen, writing about the disappearance of dimensions explained: 
[W]e may find that some of the five dimensions are currently viable whereas others have 
disappeared… In the latter instance, it is anticipated that the new dimensions will have 
emerged in place of the old. But this is no cause for anxiety, rather, it is a reason for 
excitement, as the dynamics of change have potential for exposing the conditions that 
produce new policy dimensions and the demise of old. (1973, 58) 
 
The analysis presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 demonstrate, some concrete 
examples of issue dimensions become part of the congressional agenda and 
affect the usual liberal-to-conservative separation of voting behavior. The data 
show the rise and subsequent disappearance of gun control during the period 
studied, the relative unidimensionality of the Reagan era, and the introduction of 
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abortion voting on the agenda. These cases present important examples of the 
dynamic nature of issue attention and dimensionality. Comparing Figures 2.1 
and 2.2 demonstrates that individual issue areas do not seem to have a large 
effect in terms of magnitude on dimensionality in a given era, but in a specific 
Congress we could expect the average cutting line to be below 45 degrees. The 
apparent dominance of the liberal-to-conservative dimension is lessened when 
examining specific issue areas in a concise time period. 
Dimensionality in the Legislative Process 
The previous sections have documented how second dimension issue 
preferences can affect roll call voting. In the first section, issue areas consistently 
affect the importance of the second dimension on roll call votes across legislative 
eras. The models presented also provide evidence for the disappearance of the 
civil rights issue dimension and the rise of the abortion dimension. This result 
informed the second section, which focused on the role these dimensions can 
play in a shorter time periods by examining specific congresses. The issue areas 
described by Clausen nearly 40 years ago are still important dimensions in roll 
call votes. Agriculture and rural development issues have had significant effects, 
both statistically and in magnitude, on the relevance of the second dimension on 
roll call voting. While issues may not always be agenda items in a given 
Congress, the significance of Clausen’s law of categorization seems to hold. 
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These results point to a third important question, where in the process are these 
votes occurring?  
 Some evidence for the nature of these votes can be found in the preceding 
analysis. In Table 2.2, we see the coefficient for final passage and amendment 
voting consistently significant and in the positive direction. But as the 104th 
Congress emerges in Table 2.3, we see the coefficients flip signs in the cases they 
are significant. In the earlier period, amendments and final passage roll calls 
were associated with a stronger first ideological dimension. In cases like the 98th 
and 100th Congress, these were the only variables found to be significant. 
Amendments that were the subject of roll call votes during the 104th-106th 
Congress were correlated with stronger second dimension of preferences, on 
average.  
 Cox and McCubbin’s (2005) cartel theory of party government asserts that 
parties should avoid bringing any issues to the floor that might produce intra-
party conflict. Successful party leadership, in the pure form of this theory, will 
result in unidimensional policy structured around the majority median legislator 
with consistent minority party losses. The gatekeeping power of committees 
exercised by the majority party may lower the unidimensional structure of 
voting (Snyder 1992), and that, during periods of strong majority parties’ agenda 
setting powers push back latent dimensionality (Dougherty et al 2014). For cartel 
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theorists, an effective vote would have a 90 degree cut line, running 
perpendicular to the first ideological dimension. From this perspective, it should 
be surprising that the House of Representatives, with rules on debate and 
amendments, should see extra dimensionality at all. 
 Some party splitting votes may be good for the majority party. We could 
expect members to be given the freedom to break with parties on specific issues 
for electoral reasons (Mayhew 1974). The wide variation in the culture and 
ideology of the individual constituencies might necessitate party leaders 
allowing members opportunities for “position taking” (Fenno 1978, Elazar 1994). 
A majority party relies on maintaining its membership beyond the current 
session. Theoretical reasons may explain second dimension voting even if we 
remove the assumption of party influence. Roll calls poorly explained by a single 
dimension may just be a necessary consequence of legislators expressing 
preferences and moving the bill to the floor median or “pivotal” ideological point 
to ensure passage (Black 1948, Krehbiel 1998).    
 A subset of votes in the Clinton era (103-106th Congresses) was created 
from the original dataset used in the preceding sections to study the effect of the 
vote type and issue areas on the dimensionality of votes. An OLS regression 
model using the absolute value of the cut line is used here as it was in the 
previous section. A dichotomous variable was created to code the type of vote. 
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Votes on procedures were coded 1 and non-procedural votes were coded 0. 
Using the PIPC dataset used previously (Rhode 2004, Carroll et al 2011), non-
procedural votes include the content of the final passage and amendment 
variables used previously as well as votes on veto overrides and the final passage 
of resolutions. The dichotomous variable for procedure was interacted with the 
significant variables for the period as displayed in Table 3: gun rights, 
agriculture, abortion, rural development and energy environment. The results of 
this model are presented in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4: Regression of the Absolute Value of the Cutting Line Angle: 
Clinton Era (1993-2000) 
(Intercept) 
 
64.984* 
(0.381) 
Procedural Vote 
 
3.117* 
(0.641) 
Gun Control -26.855* 
(4.276) 
Agriculture -26.832* 
(3.871) 
Abortion -17.652* 
(3.961) 
Energy & Environment 
 
-6.812* 
(1.274) 
Procedural * Gun Control 
 
2.156 
(7.155) 
Procedural * Agriculture 35.821* 
(8.975) 
Procedural * Abortion 0.100 
(5.115) 
Procedural * Rural 21.554* 
(3.956) 
Procedural * Energy & Environment 
 
10.131* 
(3.051) 
N 3965 
  Note: Standard Errors in parentheses, * = p ≤ 0.05 
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 The results in Table 2.4 are striking. The interactive variables show a 
complete reversal of the coefficients for the individual issue dimension codes. In 
every case, the coefficient for the interactive variable was higher than the 
individual issue code. When the vote on an issue deals with a procedural item, 
the second dimension’s importance was reversed. There were 3965 votes in the 
Clinton presidency used in this analysis, of which 1346 were procedural. 
Importantly, 333 were on the passage of special rules, and of the 170 were 
motions on the previous question 143 involved the passage of special rules. The 
importance of the structure of these rules, and the ability for negative agenda 
control by parties through these rules, has been demonstrated in previously 
(Oleszek 2007). Given this data, partisan and therefore ideological voting may be 
more about procedure than substance. 
 Perhaps more intriguing are the results for gun rights and abortion issues 
on procedural votes. Contrary to the way the rest of the variables perform, there 
was no significant influence for these issue dimensions in procedural votes. 
There are some interesting theoretical explanations for this result. Groups like 
the National Rifle Association and the Brady Campaign on gun control issues, 
and National Right to Life Committee (NRLC) and National Abortion Rights 
Action League (NARAL) create legislative profiles for MCs on issues based on 
roll call votes (Roberts and Bell 2008). These votes are often on final passage and 
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amendment votes, but procedural motions are used for issues where roll calls 
were not taken. Two of the eight votes for NARAL in 2011 were procedural 
motions, as were two of 10 NRLC’s votes. Position taking may be a crucial 
incentive for members of Congress when votes concern issues important to the 
primary or prospective constituency (Fenno 1978, Bishin 2000). 
 Is it possible the results presented in Table 2.4 are due to the partisanship 
that marked the Clinton presidency? When parties are strong at controlling the 
floor agenda, voting on procedural issues should in theory be more 
unidimensional and party based, even if the second dimension affects issue 
activity. To test this idea, an OLS model was created to see if the interactive effect 
of procedural votes in issue areas was consistent. This model used the dataset 
from the first model in Table 2.1, the pre 96th Congress model (1953-1980). The 
consistent dimensionality of rural and agriculture issues across these periods 
allowed for comparison; additionally, the disappearance of votes coded as civil 
rights and the rise of abortion roll call votes allowed for testing of a salient social 
category in each period. The results are presented in Table 2.5 below. 
 While procedure votes are associated with a minimal increase in the 
steepness of the cut line, the results for the pre-96th Congress are much different 
than the Clinton presidency. A few hypotheses for this result should be 
considered. It is possible that the kind of interest group activity discussed 
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previously is at work here as well (see Hansen 1991). It could also be a result of a 
change in procedural norms and strategies. The special rule seems a likely 
suspect, but the pre-96th universe of votes includes 344 votes on special rules out 
of 1623 procedural votes (21.1%) compared to 333 special rule votes of 1346 
procedure roll calls (24.7%) in the Clinton presidency. A final hypothesis is that 
general party systems or eras are responsible for this dynamic. Perhaps the 
Table 2.5: Regression of the Absolute Value of the Cutting Line Angle: 
Pre 96th Congress and Clinton Era  
 Pre-96th Congress Clinton Era 
(Intercept) 
 
59.098* 
(0.298) 
64.186* 
(0.366) 
Procedural Vote 
 
1.498* 
(0.593) 
3.836* 
(0.628) 
Rural 
 
-14.607* 
(2.796) 
-20.607* 
(2.049) 
Agriculture 
 
16.355* 
(1.487) 
-26.034* 
(3.909) 
Civil Rights 
 
-11.846* 
(1.865) 
 
Abortion  16.854* 
(4.001) 
Procedural * Rural 
 
-2.066 
(5.677) 
20.835* 
(3.994) 
Procedural * Agriculture -3.933 
(2.934) 
35.103* 
(9.067) 
Procedural * Civil Rights -4.208 
(3.030) 
 
Procedural * Abortion  -0.618 
(5.165) 
N 6320 3965 
  Note: Standard Errors in parentheses, * = p ≤ 0.05 
 “Conservative Coalition” years in the House procedure votes were affected by 
two dimensions, while Congress in the partisan “Contract with America” era of 
impeachment the first dimension of party ideology was dominant. In any of 
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these cases, the effect of the type of vote on the dimensionality of the vote 
warrants further research.  
Conclusion: The Role and Importance of Issues on the Second Dimension? 
Second dimension issues have been critically important in American history, and 
the persistence of intra-party division on key political issues into the modern 
Congress provides support that issues outside the liberal to conservative 
continuum were not as insignificant as some researchers have claimed. By 
exploring the dimensionality of roll call voting from a variety of perspectives, a 
more complex picture emerges the modern polarized Congress. A picture that 
demonstrates changing coalitions on important issues outside the 
unidimensional Congress.  
 In the first section of this chapter two legislative eras were examined to 
explore the persistence of the extra-dimensional issues, as outlined by Clausen 
and other theorists. The periods from 1953-1970 (83-96th Congress) and 1981-
2008 (97th-110th Congress) both had statistically significant effects for rural 
development, agriculture assistance and gun rights issues on the dimensionality 
of the roll call vote. The civil rights issue dimension in the pre-96th Congress 
seems to have been replaced as the rise of the abortion issue dimension in the 
post-96th Congress proved to have significant effects. These results show the 
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continuity of issue dimensions across a wide stretch of congressional history, but 
also that new issues may rise to significance. 
 The results of the first part of this analysis showed both the consistency of 
issues like agriculture and the emergence of new issues. Given the evidence of 
issue intrusion, I explored how these individual issue areas could affect the 
dimensionality of roll call voting within specific meetings of Congress. Looking 
at 12 different Congresses, there is indeed great variability in the importance of 
each issue over time. In the first six congresses (96th-101st) there were often not 
even enough roll call votes on abortion to include the variable in the analysis, in 
the following six congresses it became one of the most significant issue areas 
affecting the dimensionality of voting. A similar dynamic was true for gun and 
rural issues. While the evidence for the impact of the second dimension was still 
seen in this analysis, the influence of the agenda was also apparent.  
 The final section of this chapter explored whether issue dimensions were 
evident in procedural votes, or only on roll calls affecting the language of 
legislation. The evidence here was surprising. When looking at the Clinton-era 
roll call votes, a vote on an agriculture issue was shown to be associated with an 
average 26 degree decrease in the absolute value of the cutting angle. Yet when 
an interactive variable was included to see how procedural votes on agriculture 
affected the cutting line, the result was an average increase of 35 degrees. The 
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reversal in the sign of the coefficients was surprising, procedural votes were 
significantly more unidimensional than votes on amendments and final passage. 
This could be explained by features of the Clinton era House. The evidence from 
a comparison model created with the pre-96th Congress data showed less 
dimensionality as procedural votes did not have a statistically significant effect 
on the cutting line of votes in the earlier period.  
 The evidence presented in the models and simulations all confirm the 
dimensionality of voting in the modern U.S. House, even within the high levels 
of polarization that have emerged in the past quarter-century. This analysis is 
only the next step of many in a growing recent literature on the dimensionality in 
Congress (Crespin and Rhode 2010, Dougherty et al 2014). Many questions are 
left to be answered, and the results here may provoke more questions than the 
results answer.  
 Poole and Rosenthal argue that: “from the late 1970s onward, roll call 
voting again became largely a matter of positioning on a single liberal-to-
conservative dimension (1997, 5).” It cannot be argued that the liberal-to- 
conservative dimension is unimportant, and the likelihood of another issue 
matching civil rights as a second dimension component is doubtful. The evidence 
provided supports challenges to the claim of a strictly unidimensional Congress 
(Koford 1989, Wilcox and Clausen 1991, Crespin and Rhode 2010). The 
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aggregation of roll call votes may just create the appearance of a nearly dominant 
unidimensional structure. Given position-taking motives and the regional 
interests of a district-based congressional constituency, specific issue areas will 
continue to conflict with the liberal to conservative ideology of some legislators. 
But as the story of the Stupak amendment illustrates, issues beyond the 
traditional unidimensional ideological space are crucial to congressional politics 
and policymaking. 
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3 
 
 
Regionalism, Culture and Representation: Environmental and 
Immigration Policy in Congress 
 
 
 
Even within a largely unidimensional and increasingly polarized Congress, 
voting coalitions on environmental and agricultural issues displayed a 
dimensionality that was markedly different than the average roll call vote. The 
hypothesis that these votes would not display a unidimensional, vertical cutting 
angle was based on the geographic nature of constituency economic interests. 
There are many examples of MCs who take environmental positions in 
opposition to their parties’ position and personal ideology pigeonhole.  
Democrats from the coal and farm belts, and Republicans from the coasts who 
worry about environmental damage all must balance the conflicting motivations 
of district or state economic interests and their own thoughts about regulation 
and the role of government. Immigration issues are analyzed here for similar 
theoretical reasons as environmental policy. Geographic fragmentation of 
constituency economic interest may also be important considerations for 
immigration issue voting. But the United States is marked by a dispersion of 
political cultures that may also influence a senator’s calculus. In the cases of both 
environmental and immigration policy we can make some claim as to how each 
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state’s Senate delegation will consider these issues on the roll call record, and 
what that observation can contribute to an understanding of polarization and 
issue politics. This chapter explores aspects of issue representation by unpacking 
the role of district economic interest and demographic constituencies. For district 
economic influences, we examine farm economies and biodiesel subsides. To 
examine the role of demographic constituency, we consider the impact of Latino 
populations English language laws and other immigration related policy. 
 The analysis in the preceding chapter utilized a very large sample of votes 
-- the entire house roll call record from 1979-2001. This chapter takes a different 
approach. Here, the analysis focuses on the U.S. Senate and considers individual 
roll call votes. A realistic, descriptive view of congressional voting requires 
examining issues and policies in detail. It is arguably this area that the 
unidimensional model is most lacking. A NOMINATE score or a personal 
ideology is a great summary of the scope of roll call voting, but it might well 
miss much about the influence of constituency interests in a single area. 
 To better understand these issues I will explore salient issue votes on 
environmental and immigration policy in the U.S. Senate. The Senate is chosen 
for two reasons, one practical and one theoretical. First, the individualized Senate 
(Sinclair 1989) of entrepreneurial operations (Loomis 1990) may create different 
conditions than the more institutional-centric House of Representatives. An 
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additional institutional consideration is the availability of outside groups to 
conduct spending on senatorial races at a much higher level than more localized 
house races.  
Environmental Policy Voting in Congress 
Literature on environmental policy combines many subfields of study within 
American policymaking, and often these separate lines of research operate 
without much dialog. Venturing into a lively debate among public policy 
researchers who test these propositions on environmental policy requires 
considering the literature of these experts. To cover these various approaches, it 
is first necessary to discuss the literature on parties, grassroots organizing and 
pressure system. Following this discussion, the focus turns to our focus on voting 
behavior in Congress.  
Scholars have noted the role of grassroots and interest group activism on 
environmental issues. In a study that tested trends in grassroots activity levels on 
specific environmental roll call votes in the Senate, a modest relationship was 
shown for mass behavior and roll call voting decisions (Fowler and Shaiko 1987). 
Grassroots protest activity is argued to impact specific issues like endangered 
species legislation and energy tax credit, yet be less important on items like shale 
oil development and redwood park expansion. The issues that were influenced 
by grassroots factors were hypothesized to be the result of interest group 
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synergy on campaigns and where issues were symbolic rather than technical 
(Fowler and Shaiko, 502). Another line of research suggests that a similar trend in 
the importance of coordination among interest groups and successful lobbying 
efforts, but further argues that changes (specifically downward trends) in 
objective environmental quality helps spur activism and interest group activity 
(Johnson, Agnon and McCarthy 2010, Johnson and Frickel 2011). Given these 
findings, grassroots activism should be most likely where: 1) issues are symbolic, 
rather than technical, 2) multiple interest groups with significant memberships 
are active, which is more likely when 3) environmental conditions are getting 
worse. 
The economic needs of a state have been shown to be an influence on roll 
call votes within the Senate. Calling the process a “tragedy of the political 
commons” Hussain and Laband (2005) found that Senators are sensitive to the 
costs of regulations and benefits reaped by environmental policies and 
regulations. Thus, Senators are more likely to pass on costs when their state 
benefits, and less likely to agree to legislation in which their state pays a cost.  
This dynamic reflects the state level factors in which MCs operate, and a role for 
influence beyond ideology. 
 The large majority of findings tend to favor ideological or party based 
explanations for voting behavior. Bernstein and Horn (1981) found ideology to 
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be the most significant influence on House members opposition to oil companies’ 
positions they argued that their “analysis is needed substantively as a 
counterweight to much of the published material, especially that by energy-
policy specialist-which incorrectly attributes congressional voting behavior to 
constituency pressures (235).” Still, they did see a significant relationship 
between oil production and MCs’ positions. Riddlesperger and King (1982) 
found that an interactive variable for party and region was most effective at 
accounting for roll call votes on energy policy in the Senate. Again, region was 
significant variable. Hird (1983) argued that environmental ideology was of 
consistent importance, but in the models examined there were significant 
influences for environmental interests, environmental quality variables, and 
numerous constituent demographics. In the Fowler and Shaiko (1987) study, 
ideology and party were significant variables in nearly every model presented, 
although grassroots and state economic interests variables also showed some 
interests. The most recent study in this tradition, by Nelson (2002), again finds 
mixed results. Nelson finds robust influences for ideology, but notes that 
regional patterns exist to this pattern, and that ideology and partisanship 
correlate at r2= 0.79. 
 These studies all examined roll call voting in Congress on environmental 
issues with generally consistent results. In all cases party or ideological variables 
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accounted for most of the roll call voting choices of MCs. Given the nature of 
party control of the roll call agenda, this should not be surprising (Cox and 
McCubbins 2005). This previous research also covers two decades, yet the most 
recent of tests was a decade ago, and using data from years previous to that. If 
polarization on environmental issues has been increasing since that time, 
revisiting and reproducing of these types of studies is necessary.  
Voting on environmental policy may be one area where the constituency 
influence and ideological models of legislative choices are most at odds. The 
environmental movement in America is entering its fifth decade, but questions 
about the use and abuse of U.S. land, water, and air go much further. 
Conservation and land management tended to be the main agenda items for 
MCs before the “Environmental Protection Agency,” “Superfund,” or “Climate 
Change” became common terms in the American lexicon. Environmental 
damage has an “excludability” problem where pollution does not stay put within 
a district. In an era of “new federalism” where Medicaid, education and drug 
laws have been devolved to the states, environmental regulation may follow. To 
prevent a state or local based approach, congressional environmental action 
could be crucial. Part of this collective action dilemma means that costs and 
benefits of regulation and incentive programs will not be felt equally across 
states. This may force MCs to consider more fully the economic considerations of 
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districts rather than other ideological bases of decision-making.  As this policy 
area develops, environmental questions may become a larger part of the public 
and Congressional agenda, requiring a greater focus on these issues. Testing the 
influences of ideological and constituency-based influences on Senate roll call 
votes contributes to a longstanding debate among congressional scholars about 
the relative importance of each of these factors.  
Research Approach 
Choosing from the League of Conservation Voters (LCV) key votes for the 111th 
Senate, I explore the relative factors that may influence environmental voting 
calculus. The LCV key vote scorecard highlights environmental votes to help 
pressure MCs by the knowledge that the record will be publicize to the media 
and to LCV membership. Since MCs are aware that these votes may be used to 
score their voting behavior, so it provides an opportunity for position taking 
(Fenno 1978, Roberts and Cohen Bell 2008).  Table 3.1 outlines the votes that were 
in the 2010 scorecard for the Senate.  
The independent variables and other controls chosen for these models 
reflect the designs of the previous studies and their underlying theory. A number 
of state level variables are included. Two variables for the economic activity of 
the states are included to reflect the possible motivations and costs to state 
industry; they include the percent of state industry from agriculture, forestry and 
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Table 3.1: 2010 League of Conservation Voters Key Vote Summary 
Topic Vote Summary and Description: Quotes from LCV Scorecard 
 
Border 
Fence 
45-52 Sen. DeMint amendment to HR4899: “Nearly one-third of the 1,950 mile 
United States-Mexico border lies within military, tribal, and public lands, 
including wilderness areas, national wildlife refuges, national parks, 
national forests, national monuments, and state parks. Much of this 
country's most magnificent and imperiled wildlife -- including jaguars, 
ocelot, bighorn sheep, Sonoran pronghorn, and hundreds of bird species -- 
depend upon these public lands for intact habitat.” NO is the pro-
environmental vote. Roll Call 272 
 
Lead Paint 60-37 Sen. Colllins amendment to HR899: “This amendment would not only 
prohibit the EPA from fining those contractors who had wanted to undergo 
safety training but were unable to do so through no fault of their own; the 
amendment could also prohibit the agency from fining those contractors 
who willfully took no precautions to confine or contain lead-contaminated 
paint chips, even if it resulted in the lead poisoning of children. NO is the 
pro-environmental vote.  Roll Call 173 
 
Dirty Air 
Act  
(SJ Res 26) 
47-53 Sen. Murkowski SJ Res 26:  “In December 2009, the EPA issued this 
"endangerment finding," concluding that, based on the best science, global 
warming pollution presents a clear threat to public health and welfare. The 
endangerment finding was the scientific determination necessary to allow 
the agency to start limiting global warming pollution under the Clean Air 
Act” This resolution would overturn the endangerment finding. NO is the 
pro-environmental vote. Roll Call 184 
 
Oil 
Subsidies 
35-61 Senator Bernard Sanders (I-VT) amendment: “to eliminate $35 billion in 
subsidies to the oil and gas industry, giveaways which were targeted for 
elimination in the President's budget; $25 billion of the savings would go to 
deficit reduction and $10 billion would be directed to the Energy Efficiency 
and Conservation Block Grant Program, a grant program that allows 
communities to invest in projects that reduce energy usage.” YES is the pro 
environmental vote. Roll Call 187 
 
Biodiesel 
Tax Credit 
41-58 Senator Grassley Amendment to HR5297: “A tax credit for biodiesel was 
created in 2004 as part of the JOBS Act, which provided $1.00 to the fuel 
blenders for each gallon of biodiesel blended into petroleum diesel. The 
credit expired at the end of 2009.” This amendment would retroactively 
extend the tax credit. NO is the pro environmental vote.  Roll Call 234 
 
Renewable 
Energy 
43-57 Senator Sanders Amendment to HR4853: “The Sanders amendment would 
provide critical funding for state and local energy efficiency projects, tax 
credits for investments in clean energy manufacturing, and loan guarantees 
for clean energy projects.” YES is the pro-environmental vote. Roll Call 275 
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fishing, and percent from manufacturing (United States Census Bureau 2010). An 
additional variable for changes in the health of the state economy is included; it 
measures the change in Gross State Product (GSP) from 2007-2008 (U.S. Bureau 
of Economic Analysis). Though the GSP variable only measures a snapshot in 
time, the votes under consideration took place in the session after the 2008 
election. So the GSP measure attempts to capture the economic outlook at the 
time of the previous election. The extent of environmental damage as measured 
by the number of National Priority List (NPL) final listing sites in each state is 
included (Environmental Protection Agency 2012). A variable that measures the 
liberalism of the state’s population in 2010 is included to reflect the electoral 
incentives faced by members of Congress (Berry et al. 1998). The final state-level 
variable is the population density of the state as measured in population per 
square mile (U.S. Census Bureau). This was included to measure farming 
capacity and industrialization, which is a good proxy for regional variables 
found to be significant in previous studies. Of the top 10 population densities, all 
are in the industrial Northeast with the exception of Florida with Southern, 
Midwest, and Northeast states becoming the next most dense respectively.  
Each of the state-level variables mentioned previously could also be 
considered as part of the same unit of analysis, as these state characteristics 
reflect the electoral base of each senator. But a number of variables that would be 
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different between Senators of the same state are included. The first variable is a 
dichotomous measure for membership on the Senate Environment and Public 
Works committee. This variable is important because it reflects the senator’s 
expertise, interest, and possible involvement with the environmental legislation 
under consideration. Two variables reflect the interest group support of Senators 
in the form of campaign contributions from oil and gas interests and 
environmental group donations. The data collected from the Center for 
Responsive Politics (2012) only code the top 50 industries contributing to each 
campaign committee, if the Oil/Gas or Environmental sector was not part of the 
top 50 sectors contributing, it was coded as 0. With only two exceptions were the 
total campaign contributions from a sector over $50,000 total over the period 
from 2005-2010, in most every case it was much less. Even in the instances where 
it could have been higher than $50,000 the fact that 50 different sectors were 
higher contributors should signal that the sector was not a key source of support 
for the senator. Finally, a measure of ideology, created using the DW-
NOMINATE procedure (see Poole and Rosenthal 1997), was included. As 
mentioned previously, the correlation between this ideology score and party 
membership was correlated at r2=0.94 and due to multicollinearity issues both 
measures could not be included. The extra variation of the ideology variable 
 61 
makes it a preferable measure, given its ability to distinguish between moderate 
and more extreme members of each party.  
Ideological v. Dimensional Voting: Biodiesel and SJ. Res 26 
In the models created for each roll call in the 2010 scorecard, two votes stood out 
as providing representations of the competing ideological and economic 
motivations for roll call voting behavior. The other models showed variations on 
these two archetypes of voting decisions. Rather than considering the entire roll 
call record, as in Chapter Two, here the focus is on specific policy votes. If 
dimensional forces push MCs to shirk partisan or ideological considerations in 
significant votes, this poses a challenge to a strict ideological model of voting 
behavior. Constituency interests can be significant when MCs are given an 
opportunity to express these preferences. These results of these models are 
presented in Table 3.2. 
 The first model is a vote on retroactive extension of the biodiesel tax 
credit. Biodiesel is a plant or animal-fat-based fuel that can be used by itself or as 
part of typical petroleum-based diesel to power diesel engines, most often 
soybeans. Agricultural states that grow soybeans have an interest in production 
and subsidies of these types of fuels. The results from the first model in Table 3.2 
show that this vote fits the economic model of voting behavior. The greater the 
share of agriculture industry in the state, the more likely  yes votes on the issue. 
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All of the state level economic or descriptive variables are significant, but the 
ideology of the state citizenry and of the senator is not. Increased contributions 
from oil interests are shown to decrease the likelihood of support for the 
biodiesel tax credit, which is unexpected, but could be explained by oil and gas 
interests attempting to limit the competition soybeans may introduce for gas. In 
this bill ideological and political positions are not shown to have an influence, 
but state characteristics and economic interests are correlated with vote choice. 
The second model in Table 3.2 is a vote on SJ Res 26, which formally 
stated congressional opposition to an EPA rule that greenhouse gases fulfill the 
“endangerment” or “cause and contribute” language of section 202(a) of the 
Clean Air Act. If implemented it would prohibit the EPA from making 
regulations against greenhouse gas polluters using the Clean Air Act. Ideology 
was the only significant variable in this model. These two roll calls provide 
evidence of both the economic and ideological models of congressional vote 
choice. In the instance of SJ. Res 26, nearly all of the variance in vote choices 
could be explained by ideology as measured. Yet the biodiesel tax credit vote 
shows that economic bases for voting decisions can be important on specific roll 
calls on critical issues in US environmental policy. 
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Table 3.2: Logit Models of Vote Choice, Environmental Issues in 111th Senate 
 Biodiesel Tax Credit SJ Res 26: Impact of 
Greenhouse Gas 
(Intercept) 6.134* 
(2.600) 
 
-1.774 
(5.770) 
Environmental Committee 0.753 
(0.806) 
 
2.471 
(2.416) 
 
Percent Change State GSP -0.368* 
(-0.148) 
 
0.431 
(0.342) 
State Citizen Ideology -0.036 
(0.025) 
 
0.021 
(0.068) 
NOMINATE 0.215 
(1.029) 
 
-12.460* 
(4.603) 
Population Density 0.010+ 
(0.006) 
 
0.002 
(0.005) 
Percent Industry: Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fishing 
 
0.458* 
(0.228) 
-0.178 
(0.546) 
Percent: Industry 
Manufacturing  
 
-0.462* 
(0.133) 
-0.341 
(0.220) 
Environmental Contributions -0.018 
(0.067) 
 
0.046 
(0.161) 
Oil Contributions 
 
-0.067* 
(0.029) 
 
-0.105 
(0.146) 
NPL Sites 2010 
 
0.016 
(0.023) 
 
0.080 
(0.061) 
N 96 97 
-2LLR 49.025* 115.009* 
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses, + = p ≤ 0.1; * = p ≤ 0.05. 
 
The results presented here provide confirmation of the previous studies 
on Congressional voting behavior on environmental issues. Ideology matters, but 
on certain votes there is evidence of economic-based voting incentives. This 
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research was far from a perfect test of these two competing models.  But it 
presents a number of possible hypotheses. One possibility is that the nature of 
the specific policy change considered matters. If we can extrapolate from the case 
of the Biodiesel and SJ Res 26 votes, it is possible that policy where economic 
benefits are centralized and costs are spread thin, as with Biodiesel subsidies, 
economic based voting behavior may be the dominant model. Alternatively, 
where costs are centralized and benefits are dispersed thinly, as with greenhouse 
gas pollution and SJ Res 26, ideological models may be dominant. This makes 
some intuitive sense. Unless a tangible and centralized economic benefit can be 
seen for a district as a result of a vote, a MC will resort to his ideological and 
partisan motivations for voting. If the legislator does not, the loss of the benefit 
or the introduction of a high cost can hurt her at the polls or otherwise damage 
her reelection chances. 
What may be the most difficult for studies of environmental voting or 
studies of Congress in general is what is not captured in roll call votes (see 
Vandoren 1990). Due to negative agenda control in the House or institutional 
rules in the Senate, many issues cannot make it to the floor to be subject to a roll 
call vote. In fact, we should expect parties to prevent roll calls in these areas (Cox 
and McCubbins 2005). As Oppenheimer (2012) explained in discussing the use of 
delay and filibuster on energy votes in the Senate, a motivated minority can 
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prevent any progress on bills. The economic influences of congressional decision-
making may be active at any one of these stages and not be able to be studied by 
examining the roll call voting record given the Senate’s institutional rules. 
 Specific, policy-changing environmental roll call votes can provide 
evidence of the economic model of Congressional voting. Systematic studies 
show that these types of state economic-interest variables have a modest, at best, 
influence on voting behavior. In the end, ideology is an effective and 
parsimonious variable that can be used to account for voting behavior on 
environmental issues and the general roll call record. But as was discussed 
previously, and most exhaustively discussed by Lee (2009), we really do not have 
a total understanding of what this variable is measuring or what it means in 
reality. Economic, constituency, and partisan influences are all endogenous to a 
legislator’s NOMINATE ideology. If we can use this finding to understand 
where and why the ideological model underperforms, or where economic 
models provide a more accurate conception of environmental policymaking, a 
more detailed understanding of congressional voting behavior may be possible. 
Representation in Immigration Policy Voting 
The case of immigration policy voting provides an excellent test for the study of 
issue politics in an era of polarization. While parties have adopted different 
policy positions on the issue of immigration at large, more specific or technical 
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programs provide areas where MCs may wish to stake out a position that differs 
from their own party platform. I argue here that the uneven geographic 
dispersion of economic interests, issue constituencies, and political culture 
provide important influences on roll-call voting that may illustrate the impact of 
other dimensions, outside of the right-left unidimensional model.  
For immigration issue voting, I argue that the district-level variables for 
the demographics and political culture of states will produce an impact on voting 
independent of their first-dimension NOMINATE ideology score. I also expect 
that senators who represent states classified as having “traditionalistic” political 
cultures will take similarly “traditionalistic” approaches to immigration policy. A 
thorough discussion of Elazar’s (1994) ideas about how political cultures shape 
policy considerations can be found in Chapter One. The hypothesis of 
“traditionalistic” political cultures impacting immigration policy voting is 
straightforward. Traditionalistic political cultures are conservative in the sense of 
wishing to maintain the social and political order. Immigration policy issues 
provide a perfect example of the possible effects of traditionalist culture. 
Mandating English as the official language of government was not an issue in 
many states historically, but in an era of changing demographics the official 
status of English now is divisive. Similarly, attempts to defund “sanctuary 
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cities,” or cities that create statutes authorizing local law enforcement to 
disregard federal immigration policy, rely on a traditionalistic argument.  
Perspectives on Immigration Policy and Representation 
This section focuses on five immigration policy votes during the 110th U.S. 
Senate. These votes were all on amendments to the Comprehensive Immigration 
Reform Act of 2007 (CIR, S. 1348). These votes were either for adoption of a 
proposed amendment, or in one case on a motion to table, and therefore kill, an 
amendment. These five votes are in no way meant to be an exhaustive 
consideration of immigration related issues, but they were chosen because they 
represent different immigration policy issues considered during CIR. A bird’s 
eye view of the process, considering all 35 roll-call votes on the immigration 
reform bill, would lack the nuance necessary for understanding specific policy 
choices and senators voting calculus. After reading floor debates and journalistic 
coverage of the immigration reform effort, I choose salient policy choices and 
examine them individually. Again, returning our focus to the level of individual 
MCs and specific votes allows us to consider the nuance of the floor record as 
well help understand the roll record.  
 The concern here is unpacking the complicated interaction of ideology 
and constituency interests, but the larger focus is still on understanding how 
MCs represent their constituencies. As such, this research contributes to a long 
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line of empirical investigation into the nature of Latino representation in 
legislatures. Specifically, how might a body like the Senate, which has a vast 
disparity in its descriptive representation of the population2, substantively 
represent the interest of its Latino or foreign-born constituents?  
 The language and theoretical approach to understanding “representation” 
in political science is largely drawn from two perspectives. The classic approach 
was the dichotomy created by Burke (1906, 1774) who distinguished between the 
elite and individual perspective of a “trustee” and that of a “delegate” who votes 
based on the opinion of the public. But when we shift perspectives to the 
representation of groups, the language of Pitkin (1967) guides the literature. 
Scholars of minority group representation use Pitkin’s categorization of 
“descriptive” and “substantive” methods of representation. Descriptive 
representation is based on a legislature, committee or council having 
membership that is “descriptive” of the population that they are representing. 
Descriptive representation can be contrasted with “substantive” representation, 
where members of another or the dominant group represents minority group 
interests.  
 Here, the focus is substantive issue representation in the Senate. The 
literature suggests that the relative size of the Latino population in a state may be 
correlated with substantive representation. Welch and Hibbing (1988) provide 
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one of the first examinations of these issues and conclude that, at least for the 
House of Representatives, substantive representation is evident, yet perhaps 
disproportionate “to the influence that their numbers warrant (297).” Lubin 
(1997) also found evidence of an influence for Latino population size on minority 
issue representation in Congress.  
 Other literature rejects the idea of substantive representation and relative 
population size. Minta’s (2009) finds no evidence of constituency influence on 
oversight and committee behavior of members of the house, instead finding that 
the descriptive identities of legislators, Latino and Black, are related to these 
“workhorse” activities. There is a similar exchange between Hero and Tobert 
(1995) and Kerr and Miller (1997) who reach alternative conclusions on the 
influence of substantive and descriptive using similar data. Given this dispute 
within the existing literature, this analysis contributes to an enduring debate. 
 What does substantive representation of the Latino population mean? As 
mentioned previously, we will consider immigration votes in the 110th Senate for 
the data. But is immigration really an issue for Latinos? And, do Latino’s have 
distinct preferences from white constituents or other groups? Pollsters note that 
Latinos care about the economy more than immigration (Saad 2012). However, in 
that Gallup poll, healthcare, unemployment and immigration were all tied at 20% 
for the most important issue for Latinos in the US. For the general population, 
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healthcare and the economy tied at 20% of respondents each, with immigration 
only being important for 8% of the adult respondents (ibid.). Griffin and 
Newman (2007) provide evidence for both: 1) the disparity between Latino issues 
and other groups and 2) the evidence of unequal substantive and descriptive 
representation. This study attempted to quantify the observed difference 
between Latino opinion and other groups. For instance, the difference between 
Latino and White opinion is less than the difference between the <25k and >75k 
income demographics, but five times the difference between men and women. 
Given this background, the relative size of the Latino and foreign-born 
populations is expected to impact the statistical likelihood of pro-immigration 
voting in the Senate. Control variable for the education levels within a district 
and the first dimension NOMINATE ideology of the senator are also included. 
Finally, for theoretical reasons discussed previously, I include a dichotomous 
variable for states that have been categorized as having traditionalistic political 
cultures. The results of these logit models are presented in Table 3.3. 
Bingaman Amendment: Guest Worker Quotas:  
As part of the amendment process for the Comprehensive Immigration Reform 
act of 2007 (CIR), Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) offered a highly technical 
amendment regarding the number of guest worker visas that can be awarded 
each year. The bill was the product of numerous previous attempts at legislation 
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and was largely a result of compromise among the “gang of twelve,” with core 
leaders like John McCain (R-AZ), Ted Kennedy (D-MA), John Kyl (R-AZ), Ken 
Salazar (D-CO), Diana Feinstine (D-CA) and Mel Martinez (R-FL). The 
amendment proposed by Sen. Bingaman sought to reduce the number of guest  
Table 3.3: Logit Models of Immigration Policy Votes in the 110th U.S. Senate 
 Bingaman 
Amendment  
Salazar 
Amendment 
Inhofe 
Amendment 
Cornyn 
Amendment 
Vitter 
Amendment 
(Intercept) 7.118* 
(2.611) 
-5.523 
(3.773) 
-3.232* 
(2.969) 
0.120* 
(2.868) 
5.482 
(3.616) 
 
Traditionalistic 
Political Culture 
0.251 
(0.724) 
-1.937 
(1.398) 
5.044* 
(2.034) 
2.072+ 
(1.121) 
-2.364+ 
(1.373) 
 
Latino 
Population 
-0.082* 
(0.039) 
0.121+ 
(0.072) 
-0.389* 
(0.140) 
-0.018 
(0.067) 
-0.045 
(0.084) 
 
Foreign Born 
Population 
0.060 
(0.075) 
-0.125 
(0.193) 
0.121 
 (0.134) 
-0.325* 
(0.146) 
0.101 
(0.180) 
 
NOMINATE  -2.998* 
(0.875) 
-10.439* 
(2.777) 
17.044* 
(3.353) 
8.201* 
(1.954) 
-9.657* 
(2.148) 
 
B.A. Degree 
Holders 
-0.311* 
(0.143) 
-0.458+ 
(0.244) 
-0.534* 
(0.265) 
0.178 
(0.171) 
-0.208 
(5.077) 
 
N 98 97 97 96 98 
-2LLR 26.017* 93.567* 91.796* -89.013* 100.877* 
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses, + = p ≤ 0.1; * = p ≤ 0.05 
 
workers to 200,000 from an original level of 400,000. Additionally it changed the 
formula for increasing these visas within the first few years. Bingaman’s floor 
speech in support of the amendment outlines some key critiques. Chief among 
these for Bingaman and his co-sponsor, and future president, Barack Obama (D-
IL) is that this high number of visas would begin a program that requires 
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workers to stay for two years and then leave the country. As then Senator Obama 
put it “As we have learned with misguided immigration policies in the past, it is 
naive to think that people who do not have a way to stay legally will just abide 
by the system and leave (153 Cong. Rec. S6511; 2007).” Rising in opposition to the 
Bingaman amendment was Sen. Edward Kennedy, an ideological ally who 
would become Obama’s strong supporter in the 2008 presidential race.  Kennedy 
argued that the program was necessary to avoid the “backdoor” nature of entry 
that many migrant workers use, but he graciously admitted that he was 
“reluctantly opposed” to the amendment before the roll call took place. Similar 
intra-partisan debate was taken between Republicans Mel Martinez of Florida 
and Jeff Sessions of Alabama, as Martinez insisted, like Kennedy, on keeping the 
original compromise of the bill. Sessions, alternatively, liked the reduction in the 
granting of guest worker visas on grounds of opposing large, new government 
programs. 
Bingaman’s amendment was adopted, 74-24, with a noticeable abstention 
by “gang of twelve” member and presidential aspirant John McCain. The results 
of the logit model show that those members with higher Latino populations were 
more likely to vote for the bill, although the first dimension ideology score was 
also statistically significant. This model left the most unexplained variance of any 
of the five models.  
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What is the conservative position on the Bingaman amendment? The 
conservative-leaning U.S. Chamber of Commerce included this on their 2007 
scorecard of the Senate, taking the same “nay” position as Senator Kennedy the 
6th most liberal senator of the time. Republicans of many stripes took alternative 
positions, and the most conservative wing of the party was grouped on the “nay” 
side of the vote, preferring to keep the large-scale guest-worker program in the 
original CIR. There was a finding of Latino issue representation, though the 
impact was slight. 
Inhofe and Salazar Amendments: English Language Politics 
Immigration politics and policies often center on the requirements for 
assimilation. Those who stress the importance of assimilation often argue that 
English should be made the official language of government. During 
consideration of CIR, there were two amendments proposed regarding the status 
of English. The first, considered here, was a strict observation of the “official 
language” idea. The proposal from Senator Jim Inhofe (R-OK) made English the 
official language of all government documents with only minor exceptions. 
Alternatively, Ken Salazar (D-CO) made a separate amendment that provided for 
the official status of English, while allowing citizens to request documents in a 
variety of languages.  
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 Consideration of the reform had caused the Senate to use the evening 
hours to work on the legislation, and it was well past 10:00pm when successive 
roll calls on amendments to CIR took place. The first vote was taken on the 
Salazar amendment, and it was adopted by a vote of 58 to 39. As the model in 
Table 3.2 demonstrates, there is a statistically significant impact for the first 
dimension ideology variable as well as the Latino population variable, though 
the Latino variable is outside the comfortable level of significance. Perhaps most 
interesting is the negative coefficient for the population variable. A reasonable 
explanation for this could be the amendments sponsor, who was only the third 
Latino senator since 1977. Additionally, this bill actually required official 
documents to be printed in different languages for anyone receiving services 
from the United States. Senator Inhofe provided this perspective on the 
alternative amendment:  
If you are opposed to English as the national language of the United 
States, then vote for the Salazar amendment. That is exactly what it does. 
His amendment says anyone who receives Federal money is entitled—this 
is an entitlement—to have the documentation in any language he or she 
chooses. It could be in Swahili, French, any other language. (153 Cong. Rec. 
S7160; 2007) 
 
 Though the Salazar amendment was adopted, it proved a short-lived 
addition to the bill. Salazar’s language was replaced by the Inhofe Amendment 
on the subsequent vote that was adopted 64 to 33. All of the variables of interest 
for the Inhofe vote choice model were statistically significant with the impact in 
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the hypothesized direction. States with traditionalistic political cultures and a 
lower percentage of Latino citizens were more likely to see their senator vote in 
favor of the Inhofe Amendment. The impact for first dimension ideology was 
significant, as in all the models considered in this section.  
Cornyn Amendment: Law Enforcement File Sharing or “Report to Deport”: 
Of particular importance to CIR was the creation of “Z” visas that, though 
differing in the specific policy language, would allow an undocumented resident 
to obtain legal residency, wait a number of years, pay a fine, and then become 
eligible for citizenship. The Cornyn amendment attempted to restrict these visas 
and proposed that data obtained in the application for these visas should be 
shared within the law enforcement community and be verified to check for 
evidence of gang affiliation and a number of other issues in applicants’ 
backgrounds.  
As a member of the “gang of twelve” Sen. Kennedy often acted as the 
voice of Democratic compromise during consideration of CIR, even when 
opposing the Bingaman amendment. In a classic example of framing in 
congressional rhetoric, Kennedy referred to the Cornyn proposal as a “report- to-
deport” amendment (153 Cong. Rec. S7145; 2007). Kennedy attempted to show 
that the interests of public safety required confidentiality in these applications so 
that undocumented immigrants might take advantage of the system, rather than 
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continuing to avoid interacting with any law enforcement agency. Sen. Cornyn 
painted an image of “binding the hands of law enforcement” in alluding the 
possible threats that these applicants could represent, including DWI offenders 
and gang members, among others (153 Cong. Rec. S7144; 2007). 
The Cornyn amendment was adopted, 57 to 39. The vote was largely 
along partisan lines, as reflected in the significance for the NOMINATE ideology 
score. Most interesting in this model was the significance of the variable for 
percent foreign-born. Theoretically, this makes a great deal of sense. You may 
notice that the coefficients for each of the population variables have different 
directions of influence in 4 of the 5 models. This amendment is no different. 
Although there is some correlation between foreign-born and Latino populations 
(R2 = 0.518) and they may have preferences that overlap, we may expect some 
policy attitudes to be different. For instance, the foreign-born measure captures 
areas where there are a large number of immigrants, but not from Latino 
backgrounds. Given the control for the Latino population in the model, this is a 
measure of states that rely on immigration, but not from Latino immigrants. In 
this case, it shows that senators from states with high numbers of immigrants 
were less likely to support the Cornyn amendment. There was also a modest 
correlation between traditionalistic states support for this amendment. Again, 
those political cultures that value a preservation of existing social structures and 
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norms should be opposed to any policy that creates more immigration, especially 
if the target of the population is assumed to be criminal.  
Vitter Amendment: “Sanctuary” Cities: 
 During consideration of a continuing budget resolution, Sen. David Vitter (R-
LA) introduced an amendment, co-sponsored by Sen. Inhofe (R-OK), that 
prohibited COPS (Community Oriented Policing Services) grants from funding 
cities that have passed policies that authorize local law enforcement agencies to 
ignore aspects of federal law regarding immigration and customs enforcement 
(ICE) or other related law enforcement groups. These “sanctuary cities,” as both 
supporters and opponents call them, have been part of localized efforts to reform 
immigration policy. In recent times there has been a backlash of cities who might 
be called “no-sanctuary cities,” which require additional effort on the part of law 
enforcement, landlords and employers in monitoring immigration status. In 
either case, the localized approach to immigration policy has been an increasing 
part of policy activity in the US.  
 The debate was short on this amendment, containing few floor remarks. 
This is partly due to the agenda for amendments to the CBR was long and each 
was considered in quick order. The lines of this debate were mostly partisan. 
Senators Durbin and Reid spoke on behalf of opponents and utilized a public 
safety frame similar to that of Kennedy during the Cornyn amendment. These 
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two Democratic stalwarts insisted that 1) the real threat to crime was the fear of 
immigrants in speaking with law enforcement and 2) removing grant money 
from the police budgets of 26 cities (154 Cong. Rec. S2063; 2008). 
 The vote considered in the fifth model in Table 3.3 is a motion to table, 
and therefore kill the Vitter amendment, which was successful 58-40. The model 
shows clearly that ideology is the most important variable of interest of those 
considered in this chapter. But senators from states with traditionalistic political 
cultures were also more likely to vote against this amendment. Republicans from 
the Midwest, Lugar, Hagel, and Voinovich all voted to table the amendment, 
while Democrats from the South, Landrieu and Warner found themselves 
against their partisan coalition. But this model still shows strong support for the 
usage of unidimensional ideology. With the exception of Elizabeth Dole (R-NC) 
each senator who voted against their own partisan majority was within the zone 
of moderate legislators, occupying the median third of Senators within the 110th 
Congress. 
Conclusion: Issue Representation and Ideology 
The uneven dispersion of economic activity, ethnic populations and political 
culture creates an atmosphere in which, even in a polarized political climate, 
MCs must balance these alternative considerations. As the debates during 
sessions on the CIR demonstrate, most of the legislation was the product of 
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compromise that should have, in theory, shielded the Senators from 
controversial position taking. In fact, theories of parties in Congress stress the 
importance of structuring legislation that can beat possible pivotal legislators 
(Krehbiel 1998 ; Tsebelis 2002) or to keep the majority party unified (Cox and 
McCubbins 2005).  
This chapter has considered the relative explanatory power of the 
unidimensional ideological and constituency interest models of legislative voting 
behavior. In the polarized era of the modern Senate, a unidimensional structure 
within the roll-call record should be commonplace. But this analysis shows 
evidence that on significant, policy-impacting roll call votes, there is an influence 
for constituency interests. Those interests were shown most dramatically in the 
consideration of biodiesel subsidies and in consideration of a federal English 
language law. In those cases, there was an observable statistical relationship 
between theoretically important constituency variables and vote choice, even 
when controlling for first dimension NOMINATE ideology. A vote-level view at 
the roll call record shows a more dynamic atmosphere than presented from 
birds-eye views of the record. There may indeed be a role for political culture, 
minority group representation, interest group influence, or any one of the many 
effects that an earlier school of congressional researchers and many 
contemporary commentators note on a daily basis.  
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What pattern emerges from this data? Constituency interests appear in 
instances when a dimensional issue can be highlighted outside the traditional 
unidimensional debate lines. The comparison between the SJ Res 26 and 
biodiesel subsides shows how this can happen. Subsidy programs that target a 
specific crop or industry, like biodiesel, can highlight constituency economic 
interests to influence voting decisions. Similarly, a policy like the strict English 
language law proposed by Sen. Inhofe can force those senators from states with 
high Latino populations to consider the electoral consequences of their vote. It 
seems no accident that the only GOP senator to vote against the Inhofe 
Amendment, Sen. Pete Dominici (R-NM), comes from the state with the highest 
Latino population.  
Chapter Two demonstrated the persistent dimensionality on the roll call 
record and identified issue areas where this dimensionality can be observed. 
Though SJ Res 26 was ostensibly about environmental policy, it was only 
symbolic action that promoted the “sense of Congress” on global warming. 
Unlike biodiesel, it conferred no direct subsides to specific industries. Unlike the 
Inhofe’s English language law, there were no direct penalties on a population. SJ 
Res 26 was part of a unidimensional ideological debate about regulation and the 
role of government, and an emerging partisan battle over recognizing global 
climate change. While the issue areas outlined in Chapter Two are likely 
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candidates for dimensional voting considerations, the polarized climate of 
Congress means that debates in these area areas are often tied to unidimensional 
or partisan conflicts. To highlight an extra dimension of preferences, roll calls 
must confer costs or benefits to economic, cultural or population based interests. 
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4 
 
Constituencies and Environmental Voting in the House of 
Representatives  
 
 
“The question for legislators is how much they should consider the known 
policy preferences of attentive publics as opposed to the potential policy 
preferences of inattentive publics when they are deciding which side to 
support on a policy dispute.” (Arnold 1991, 65; emphasis added) 
 
Following a defeat in the 2012 Senate Republican primary, six-term Senator 
Richard Lugar (R-IN) released a statement to explaining his interpretation of the 
loss. Lugar mentioned a number of factors that, he felt, caused him to lose the 
seat he held since Jimmy Carter inauguration. Largely, Luger thought that his 
primary was decided before his challenger entered the race. Stating simply that: 
“the re-election of an incumbent to Congress usually comes down to whether 
voters agree with the positions the incumbent has taken. I knew that I had cast 
recent votes that would be unpopular with some Republicans and that would be 
targeted by outside groups (CNN 2012).” Citing votes confirming Supreme 
Court justices Sotomayor and Kagan, as well as votes on the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP), Lugar knew that he could pay an electoral price for his 
positions. It was not only moderates on the Republican side who faced electoral 
consequences in primaries. In 2006, Joe Lieberman, former Democratic vice-
presidential candidate lost a Senate primary to a more ideological extreme 
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candidate, Ned Lamont. While Lugar’s votes on TARP and liberal Supreme 
Court justices may have written his epitaph, it was the Iraq war that forced 
Lieberman to return to the Senate as an independent.  
 Recent published research has countered the claim “getting primaried” is a 
growing phenomenon (Boatright 2013). The data on primary challenges do show 
that there may not be an increase in the trend of successful primary challenges, 
just changes to the nationalization of fundraising and election coverage. But these 
primary challenges may result in changing behavior if senators and 
representatives, like Senator Lugar, believe them to be trends. How important is 
the primary constituency to a MCs voting calculus? Do the “potential 
preferences” (Arnold 1990, 10) of multiple constituencies feature in roll call 
voting? Using the Congressional Election Study by Stone (2010) this paper explores 
the influence of primary constituency ideology on environmental roll call voting. 
In Chapters Two and Three, environmental policy votes displayed second-
dimension considerations and a role for constituency interests. This chapter 
shows that often, MCs dimensional preferences may be suppressed in the face of 
an ideologically extreme primary constituency that prioritizes the first dimension 
of preferences. This speaks to the broader argument that the observed 
unidimensionality of the modern Congress may be a result of prioritizing a 
primary constituency, rather than the failure of a constituency-interest model.  
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Primary Voters and Congressional Behavior 
A central underpinning of the argument that Senator Lugar and others is that 
primaries play a role in tempering the behavior of MCs. Huntington (1950) first 
presented an argument featuring a role for multiple constituencies, linking the 
changes in district ideological polarization to changes in district behavior, where 
there is an inverse relationship between the qualitative differences between 
parties (policy positions) and the quantitative differences (vote share). 
Abramowitz (2012) demonstrates how polarization within the electorate has led 
to a reduction of moderates in the Senate. But some authors disagree on the level 
of partisan polarization in the average public (Layman, Carsey and Horowitz 
2006; Fiorina and Abrams 2008). This may be part of a process of “moderate 
extremism” described by Merill and Grofman (1999), in which multiple elections 
and strategic behavior can lead to relatively extreme candidates compared to the 
median voter, but not necessarily ideological outliers. These overlapping 
constituencies of electoral support has been given significant attention in the 
congressional literature, including a MCs “home style” (Fenno 1978), the 
importance of “intensity” of positions within constituencies (Kingdon 1981), and 
the pull of “sub-constituencies” (Bishin 2000). 
Burden (2004) found that candidate divergence (polarization) is partially 
due to the ideological positioning of primary voters. Echoing that finding, Brady 
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et al. (2007) showed that candidate’s ideology is pulled away from the district 
median and towards the primary voters, moderate incumbents are likely to face 
primary challengers, and more extreme candidates do better in primary 
elections. While these authors provide compelling evidence on the role of the 
primary electorate, others refute this claim. Ansolabhere et al. (2001) presents 
three patterns in the data which “cast doubt” on this logic (152). First, in 1996 
candidates who faced a primary challenger voted more centrally ideologically 
than those who did not face primary challengers. Second, as districts become 
more heterogeneous, the MC is likely to converge on the district preferences. 
Finally, the authors find the changes in responsiveness, which decreased since 
the introduction of party primaries, but to a point lower than the 1940 period 
with virtually no primaries a phenomenon that “begs explanation (153).”  
Critiques of the multiple constituencies argument are largely misguided. 
In many cases the data does not necessarily support their conclusion, or could be 
interpreted differently and observationally equivalent. First, in 1996 it is possible 
that moderates were more likely to face challengers because of their moderate 
voting behavior. The party faithful rewards those MCs who vote away from the 
district median, on behalf of primary supporters, with a free pass to the general 
election, as Brady et al. (2007) found. Second, if MCs tend to position themselves 
at the district median in heterogeneous districts, doesn’t it follow that in 
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homogeneous districts, the dominant party or primary constituency has the most 
pull? Finally, they will get no argument from Gerber and Morton (1998) and 
Burden (2004), who also argue that responsiveness has decreased due to an 
institutional change to primaries.  The answer to the question of why 
responsiveness to the district has fallen to 1940s levels can be found in parties, 
who allow the strong partisans to choose candidates. Candidates must win the 
support of primary voters at the ballot box, rather among party leaders in back 
rooms. As described by Schattschneider (1960), the change in the scope of conflict 
within the primary system seems a likely culprit for changes in MC convergence 
with district preferences. When the conflict is among strong partisans, in back 
rooms of party bosses or ideologically polarized primaries, they will diverge. 
Given the literature described previously, I argue that the environmental 
voting behavior may reflect the importance of primary voters, sometimes over 
the general electorate. MCs that face more moderate primary constituencies will 
be more likely to vote moderately on salient issues on the roll call agenda, 
whereas MCs who must face more ideologically extreme primary constituencies 
cannot make the same choices. This expectation holds on both sides of the 
ideological continuum, where the conservatism and liberalism of the primary 
electorate is rewarded with policy that reflects their ideology. 
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 This analysis relies on the Congress Election Study conducted by Stone 
(2010). In October of 2006, Stone surveyed political elites by mail in 155 
congressional districts. These political elites were chosen due to their status as 
delegates at the 2004 Democratic and Republican national conventions. The 155 
districts represented a random sample of 100 districts, and an additional 
purposive sample of 55 competitive districts. For this analysis, only the randomly 
sampled districts were included in the research presented here.3 A total of 970 
delegates participated in the survey, a response rate of 21%.  
The key independent variable of analysis was a measure of primary 
extremism. Respondents in Stone’s survey were asked to describe the ideology of 
a number of actors and populations that included themselves, general election 
voters, primary voters, and candidates. A purged mean of the respondent 
answers for each district were used.4 The original scale for this variable was a 
seven-point ideology (1= “very liberal”; 4= “middle of the road”; 7= “very 
conservative”). To compare Democrats and Republicans within the same scale, a 
four-point “primary extremism” scale was constructed.5 The influence of this 
variable will be contrast with a measure of general election support. The vote 
share for John Kerry in the 2004 presidential election, a common variable for 
previous research on this subject, is used to measure the general election 
ideology.6 Beyond the measure of district partisanship, the data contain other 
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important variables for this analysis. First, controls for other district 
characteristics were needed.  Here, the white percent of the total population in 
the district as of the 2000 census is utilized for a measure of the racial diversity. A 
variable for district wealth was also included for the mean income, in thousands, 
of the district as of the 2000 census.  
The analysis will focus on environmental voting using the scores of the 
League of Conservation Voters (LCV) scores for the 2006 legislative session 
(League of Conservation Voters 2013). Table 4.1 shows the votes considered in 
this session. Environmental voting was used as a case in the previous chapters to 
examine changing dimensionality over time and how issue votes can be 
influenced by constituency factors. The biodiesel and SJ Res 26 votes were taken 
from the 2010 Senate scorecard. The LCV is commonly used to measure and 
contains salient, policy-impacting votes on environmental issues. MCs are aware 
that these votes may be used to score their voting behavior, so it provides an 
opportunity for position taking (Fenno 1978, Roberts and Cohen Bell 2008). 
Importantly, these scores represent actual roll calls that have been seen as 
influential signals of a MCs preference on environmental conservation, and the 
MCs are aware that they may be held accountable for these votes. Figure 4.1 
shows the relationship of LCV scores and primary extremism variables. 
Observations and a least-squares line are also included for each party. 
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Table 4.1: 2006 League of Conservation Voters House Key Vote Summary 
 
LCV Name Roll  Vote Summary and Description 
Food Safety 32 283-139 Rogers (R-MI) HR4167: The National Uniformity for Food Act. 
Requires all food labeling laws to be guided by federal standards. 
This would invalidate California’s more strenuous reporting 
requirement on the use of chemicals in processed food. NO is the 
pro-environment vote. 
Low 
Income 
Energy 
Assistance 
66 287-128 Snowe (R-ME) amendment to SCR 83 to add $1b of funding for 
low income housing insulation and weatherization.  YES is the 
pro-environment vote. 
Salvage 
Logging 
147 189-236 Rahall (D-WV) amendment to H.R. 4200 that would strike the 
bill's waivers of the National Environmental Policy Act and other 
environmental laws in the bill. YES is the pro-environment vote.  
Salvage 
Logging 
151 243-182 Vote on HR4200 the Forest Emergency Recovery and Research 
act. Would permit logging in national forests after fires with 
waivers for traditional protections in the National Environmental 
Policy Act.  NO is the pro-environment vote. 
Toxic 
Release 
165 231-187 Pallone (D-NJ) and Solis (D-CA) amendment to prevent EPA 
from lowering reporting requirements on toxic chemicals. YES is 
the pro-environment vote. 
Drilling 
Royalties 
167 252-165 Hinchey (D-NY) amendment preventing oil companies involved 
in deep-water drilling in the Gulf benefiting from unlimited 
royalty relief from receiving future drilling leases. YES is the pro-
environment vote. 
Tongass 
Logging 
Roads 
168 237-181 Chabot (R-OH) and Andrews (D-NJ) amendment to end taxpayer 
subsidies for new commercial logging roads in the Tongass 
National Forest. YES is the pro-environment vote.  
Clean 
Water 
169 222-198 Oberstar (D-MN), Leach (R-IA), and Dingell (D-MI) amendment 
that would force the EPA to rescind a directive on small bodies of 
water and reaffirm a broad application of Clean Water Act 
protections. Yes is the pro-environment vote. 
Offshore 
Drilling 
170 217-203 Putnam (R-FL),  Capps (D-CA), Davis (D-FL), and Foley (R-FL) 
amendment to keep a moratorium on drilling within 3 miles of 
the shoreline in place. YES is the pro-environment vote. 
ANWR 209 225-201 H.R. 5429, a bill to allow drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife 
Reserve (ANWR). NO is the pro-environment vote 
Oil 
Refineries 
232 238-179 Bass (R-NH) and Barton (R-TX) H.R. 5254, Refinery Permit 
Process Schedule Act, a bill to expedite the refinery permitting 
scheme. NO is the pro-environment vote 
Offshore 
Drilling 
356 232-187 Jindal (R-LA) H.R. 4761, Deep Ocean Energy Resources Act. 
Would permit oil and gas drilling within 100 miles and give 
states the option to allow drilling as close as three to seven miles 
off their coasts. NO is the pro-environment vote.  
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Figure 4.1 The Influence of Primary Voter Ideology on LCV Scores 
 
 
 
Table 4.2 shows the results of an OLS regression of the LCV scores on 
primary extremism and other district control variables. The data was subset by 
political party providing two models for each voting score. All of the 
independent variables in the model were measured prior to 2006, and were 
sourced from the Congressional Election Study. LCV scores are measured out of 
100, where 100 is the most environmentally friendly for the LCV, for this year 
there are 13 votes so around 8 points for each vote.  As an OLS model, the 
coefficients in the model allow for ready interpretation of the magnitude of the 
results. For instance, for a Republican representative, moving from “Somewhat 
Conservative” to “Conservative” indicates a swing of 20 points on the LCV 
scorecard, or 2-3 votes. The standard error suggests that we can be confident the 
result is between 10-30 points for each move down the primary extremism scale. 
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Table 4.2: The Influence of Primary and General Election Ideology on Environmental Voting 
 
  Democratic Model f Republican Model 
(Intercept) 
 
-46.544* 
(19.011) 
-27.305 
(36.08) 
Primary Extremism 
 
      6.001 
      (3.916) 
-19.781* 
 (9.043) 
Kerry Vote 2004 
 
     1.239* 
     (0.248) 
0.873 
(0.543) 
White Population 
 
     0.239* 
     (0.115) 
0.263 
(0.265) 
Mean Income      0.713* 
     (0.254) 
0.778* 
(0.332) 
N 52 43 
R2      0.535 0.428 
 Note: Standard Errors in parentheses, * = p ≤ 0.05 
 
To better facilitate observing how these changes impact the key votes, a 
post-estimation simulation of the models in Table 4.2.7 Both graphs demonstrate 
the expected change in a MC’s LCV score as the primary electorate base tends 
toward extreme. Roughly every eight points on the LCV scale represents one 
“key” vote. The two graphs are placed vertically on one another to allow 
comparison of the two axis scales. The LCV scorecard ranges from 1-100, but this 
is broken between the two parties due to the lack of overlap. Comparing figures 
one and two, you can see how the simulations from the model reflect the actual 
observed values, but with confidence intervals and controls for other district 
variables.  
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Figure 4.2: Simulated Values of LCV Scores by Primary Voter Extremism 
 
 
 
 
A Republican candidate in a district with a “somewhat conservative” 
primary population is expected to engage in environmental voting, as measured 
by the LCV scores, much more environmentally friendly than the party mean. 
For Republicans the mean LCV score is outside the confidence intervals for 
observations at the extremes. For both parties, this graph demonstrates the 
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changing nature of environmental voting as primary electorates vary in 
extremism. But the evidence presented here shows only a statistically significant 
difference for the Republicans.  
Alternatively, for Democrats the mean is at all points still within the 95% 
confidence intervals shown. This is also evident in the model presented in Table 
4.2, where the coefficient for the “Primary Extremism” variable in the Democratic 
model is not statistically significant, though it was in the hypothesized direction.   
Median Voters vs. Primary Voters: Asymmetric Polarization?  
The results presented in Table 4.2 suggest that for Republicans in this sample, 
primary voter’s ideology has an impact on environmental voting, where those 
with moderate primary bases may have, on average, six more “environmentally 
friendly” voting decisions as measured by LCV scorecard. But, the variable for 
the median voter ideology, here measured by the 2004 two-party vote share for 
John Kerry, shows the opposite result. In this specification, the role of the median 
voter ideology is not significant for the Republicans, but it is significant for the 
Democrats. Given the coefficient for the Kerry voteshare, the average impact of a 
1% increase in the Kerry vote is about a 1.2-point increase in the LCV score for 
the Democratic representative. To illustrate this graphically, a simulation with 
similar specifications as Figure 4.2 was created to demonstrate the impact of 
median voter ideology on LCV scores. 
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The 95% confidence intervals in Figure 4.3 demonstrate how the changing 
vote shares for John Kerry correlate with the voting score given by the LCV. It is 
important to note that the simulations relied upon the observed values of the  
Figure 4.3: Simulated Values of LCV Scores by Primary Voter Extremism
 
Kerry vote, for Republicans this was between 21-54%, for Democrats this was 
between 30-61%. The confidences intervals show that for Democrats there is a 
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strong statistical relationship that is much different than the median Democratic 
score.  
 This mixed result, the pull of median voters for Democrats and of primary 
voters for Republicans, is suggested by other researchers concerned with 
polarization in Congress. Hare, McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2012) declare, 
“Polarization is real, and asymmetric.” By “asymmetric” they argue that 
Republicans are moving toward the ideological extremes at a level more quickly 
than their Democratic counterparts. The model of “asymmetric polarization” 
provided by Hare et al. explains the data on environmental voting presented here 
quite clearly. One can imagine a scenario in which Democratic members of 
Congress would want to avoid the “environmentalist” label in a general election 
contest in the same way that the “anti-regulation” label might be valuable in a 
primary election for Republican MCs.  
Personal Ideology? 
Previously we considered the role of primary voter and general election 
constituencies. But, dominant models of congressional behavior argue that the 
ideology of MCs will outweigh constituency influences, primary or general 
election, in determining voting preferences. Despite the influence of the different 
constituencies on environmental voting behavior in the models presented, the 
influence of a MCs personal ideology is still an important consideration. If, as 
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Poole and Rosenthal (2007) argue, MCs have a consistent ideology with which 
they base their votes, the model of MCs as “delegates” of any constituency seems 
less important. To understand the relative importance of the MCs personal 
ideology, each MCs first dimension D-W Nominate score (Poole and Rosenthal 
2007; Carroll et al. 2011) replaced the variable for the 2004 Kerry vote share in the 
original models. Due to the high correlation between the D-W Nominate score 
and the Kerry vote share (r2 = 0.764), multicollinearity prevents these measures 
from being included in the models simultaneously. If both measures are 
included, one or both of the variables are statistically insignificant, though often 
the primary election measure remains distinct from the null hypothesis of no 
influence.  
A serious note of caution should be used in evaluating these models. It is 
problematic to include two measures of voting behavior, NOMINATE and LCV 
scores, in alternate sides of a regression model. NOMINATE scores use the votes 
included in the LCV scorecard as part of their classification scheme, and they 
track well with one another. But to evaluate an independent effect of primary 
extremism on environmental voting, these models can be useful. All other 
specifications in Table 4.3 remain the same as in Table 4.2.   
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Table 4.3: The Influence of Primary and MC Ideology on Environmental Voting 
  Democratic Model f Republican Model 
(Intercept) 
 
-5.557 
(13.364) 
38.243 
(32.627) 
Primary Extremism 
 
    8.05* 
      (3.964) 
-21.15* 
 (8.016) 
D-W NOMINATE 
 
     -97.849* 
     (26.375) 
-50.536* 
(19,642) 
White Population 
 
     -0.037 
     (0.093) 
0.147 
(0.26) 
Mean Income        0.977* 
   (0.26) 
1.018* 
(0.284) 
N 52 43 
R2      0.583 0.48 
 Note: Standard Errors in parentheses, * = p ≤ 0.05 
 
Despite the small number of cases in the models for both Table 4.2 and 4.3, 
the robustness and consistency of the multivariate analysis is surprising.  For 
environmental “key votes,” as measured by the LCV scorecard, there is often an 
observable statistical relationship between the ideology of the primary electorate 
and the voting preferences of MCs.  This effect is shown to be independent of 
personal ideology, as measured by the first dimension D-W NOMINATE score 
for legislators in the Congressional Election Study sample.  
There is also an obvious relationship between the NOMINATE measure 
and the LCV scores. In the models presented, the independent impact of primary 
voter ideology is 8 (±4) for Democrat MCs and 21 (±8) for each one-point 
change. Again, the coefficient is higher for Republicans, as suggested in the 
discussion of asymmetric polarization. Democratic legislators, in this model 
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specification, are expected to move about have one different “key vote” than the 
average Democrat for each move down the primary ideology spectrum.  
Conclusion: Ideology, Representation and Constituency Responsiveness  
Environmental voting, shown in previous chapters as being an important 
dimensional issue, can be suppressed in the face of an extreme primary 
constituency that values ideological purity. Chapter three distinguished votes 
that conferred costs and benefits, like subsidies or enhanced ID restrictions, and 
votes like SJ Res 26 that simply promoted policy ideas. Where costs and benefits 
were redistributed, dimensional considerations could be a factor in the voting 
calculus. Here, the evidence suggests that for MCs with extreme primary 
constituencies, second dimension considerations can be overruled. This does not 
imply a failure of constituency influence on MCs roll call behavior; in fact it 
indicates the opposite. As agents of multiple principles, it may be efficient 
representation to prioritize the preferences of the agent that has the most power 
over your reelection. 
Though the models presented here confirm the effectiveness of DW-
Nominate measures, there is room for “what else?” questions of congressional 
voting behavior. Recovering MC ideology from roll call votes and comparing 
member ideology over time is an important endeavor for the scholarly 
community focused on Congress. But, two points should be made here. Senator 
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Lugar’s claims his votes on TARP, the strategic missile treaty with Russia, and 
the confirmation of Presidential appointments to the Supreme Court cost him his 
long-held Senate seat. If Sen. Lugar’s logic is correct, and other senators and 
representatives are not as principled as he, the temptation to vote as a delegate of 
one’s primary constituency will be large. Compromise may be difficult in this 
scenario. If, as the Mayhewian logic contends, MCs are solely concerned with 
reelection, this behavior seems predictable and highly rational. If one changes the 
lens of “representation” away from the general electorate, MCs may be 
calculating delegates of their primary constituency on many key votes. 
Second, elections in Congress should be considered more as a source of 
DW-Nominate ideal points. In the highly polarized partisan era of the modern US 
Congress, party and ideology are correlated at nearly 96%. To be sure, this 
represents the rampant polarization evident on Capitol Hill (see Hare et al. 2012). 
But, it also requires us to examine the sources and examples where the 
ideological model does not perform well. This paper has demonstrated a link 
between constituents, both general election and primary, and their 
representatives voting behavior.   
The picture of constituency links presented here is not unlike previous 
studies (Mayhew 1974, Fenno 1978, Bishin 2000). MCs behavior is conditioned by 
a number of influences. Ideology may be chief among these, but the rational 
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Downsian model of representation is still evident in the data presented here, 
however the median may be shifted to the extremes of primary voters, at least for 
Republicans in the models presented here. Studies of congressional decision-
making would benefit from a returned focus on the new nature of constituency 
representative relationships. Even if our measures of ideology, like NOMINATE, 
perform with high accuracy, the sources of these ideal points should still be of 
interest to any congressional scholar. The implications of legislative behavior 
extend beyond students of Congress, but inform our knowledge of policy 
change, political institutions, and their effects. If the analysis here is correct, 
constituency influence through elections may be alive and well. It is an open 
question, however, if that is good news.  
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5 
 
 
Issue Constituencies, Political Culture and Abortion Voting in the 
Senate 
 
 
 
Chapter Two demonstrated that abortion roll calls displayed attributes similar to 
civil rights votes in the period that Poole and Rosenthal argued intra-party 
divide on civil rights made it the content of the second dimension (1997, 57). 
While it is unlikely that any single issue category creates the content spectrum 
for the second dimension in the modern unidimensional Congress, coalitions on 
abortion voting show a consistent statistical variation in the cutting angle, and 
that that is maintained on both procedural and other votes. Given these findings, 
it is important to explore issue voting on abortion policy from a detailed 
perspective, rather than the decades-wide consideration of the entire roll call 
agenda. 
 If the distribution of political cultures across the United States creates 
opportunities for policy considerations outside the traditional liberal-
conservative first dimension, as discussed in the immigration section in Chapter 
Three, then perhaps we can expect a similar role for culture on abortion voting. 
Though there is evidence that abortion underwent an “issue evolution” (see 
Chapter One, Carmines and Stimson 1989, Adams 1997, Lindaman and Haider-
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Markel 2002), it is difficult to place abortion on the traditional unidimensional 
issue space. Are abortion regulations a path to a larger or smaller government 
apparatus? Do abortion restrictions secure or limit the rights of an individual?  
Party divergence on abortion issue stances and voting could be a product of 
partisan conflict around issue ownership, rather than a small government- big 
government ideological debate. From this perspective, a traditionalistic political 
culture’s focus on maintaining the existing moral and social order may influence 
voting behavior on abortion issues in the way that it was shown to be correlated 
with immigration votes considered in Chapter Three. 
 The previous chapter was focused on the role of primary voters and 
argued that a sub-constituency (Bishin 2000) ideology or extremism can influence 
key policy votes. The focus for Chapter Four was environmental voting as 
measured by LCV key votes in the House of Representatives and primary voters, 
here we consider issue advocates on abortion policy and their activities influence 
on abortion voting in the Senate. The arguments in each analysis provide a 
similar conceptual model of a MC confronted with a tough issue vote who, as 
Kingdon argues, anticipate and adjust their voting behavior to prevent possible 
negative electoral consequences (1981, 60-68). Arnold (1991) outlines a similar 
mechanism in his quote that begins the previous chapter. Should a Senator be 
concerned with an attentive public, who almost certainly will be engaged in the 
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political process come election time, or the possible outrage of an unspecified 
public? While the answer to this question is no doubt conditional, this chapter 
attempts to shed light on that question in a similar way that primary extremism 
was discussed in the previous chapter. Do abortion advocate groups exercise 
influence on the voting behavior of Senators when considering abortion policy 
votes? 
 Beyond the specific consideration of abortion advocacy activity in a state, 
this chapter will also contribute to the broader theme of issue calculus in 
Congress and the ideological content of the roll call record. Similar to Chapter 
Three, attention will be played to the policy issue considered, the frames and 
divisions among Senators making speeches from the floor and the eventual result 
of the vote. In the end, this analysis provides cautious support that abortion 
advocates (or the lack of abortion advocates) in a state may be a policy 
consideration for Senators. Political culture and the electoral environment of the 
state are the most important predictors of abortion policy voting considered here. 
Perspectives on Abortion Activity in Congress 
Abortion politics and policy has been a focus of attention for practical politicians, 
journalists and researchers for a number of decades. The issue looms large in 
American culture despite little ground for wholesale policy change absent a 
constitutional amendment. The most exhaustive attention to abortion voting in 
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Congress is by Ainsworth and Hall (2011) who contend that the electoral 
incentives surrounding the issue create an environment where MCs focus on 
“strategic incrementalism.” This logic relies on viewing abortion politics as a 
serious of mobilizations and counter-mobilizations (Staggenborg 1991) and 
understanding that the risk of providing motivation to opponents or increasing 
the scope of conflict. This research also contributes to a classic discussion on the 
nature of group behavior and influence on policy (Bentley 1908; Truman 1971). 
Ainsworth and Hall argue, “Legislators may want to minimize sabotage efforts 
and ease their task of vote explanation” (2011, 54; see also Miller and Stokes 1963 
on “explaining votes”). These perspectives fit nicely within the narrative of this 
research that strategic legislators are weighing the relative impact of their voting 
decision on their electoral constituencies, rather than their own ideologies. 
 The issue of abortion is also widely researched for those interested in 
polarization and issue evolution. Though Adams (1997) makes a convincing case 
for issue evolution on abortion, and others have commented on its role in 
polarization (Carmines and Woods 2002), many scholars pay attention to the 
prevalence of party splitting of legislators (as with Rep. Stupak discussed 
previously) and of the commonalities in public opinion. Ainsworth and Hall 
(2011) note that the most active sponsor of bills and amendments related to 
abortion was not a conservative of the moral majority ilk, but rather “liberal 
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stalwart” Rep. James Oberstar (D-MN) (125). Their data on bill sponsorship show 
68.1% of abortion related bills by the most liberal members (NOMINATE score < 
-0.5) were pro-life in nature, and 73.6 of all Democratic MC abortion bills 
sponsorships were for pro-life measures (ibid. 127). For the last decade in their 
data (1993-2004), the numbers have begun to split and show evidence of issue 
evolution, yet still 39% of the abortion measures introduced by the “Most 
Liberal” legislators was pro-life in orientation (ibid. 130). 
 Moving from the halls of Congress to public opinion, there is a debate on 
the relative strength and state of polarization on abortion policy. Fiorina et al. 
(2005) make a strong claim that commonalities across parties and people are 
stronger than the differences within issue arenas like abortion. But as Adams 
(1997) analysis, Jelen and Wilcox (2003) review of the state of public opinion 
literature on abortion, and Abramowitz (2010, 45) consideration of polarization 
and citizen engagement levels demonstrate, party issue ownership and 
polarization are observable and have almost certainly increased over time. The 
important result of this debate within the literature is that political scientists have 
a hard time estimating the dispersal and strength of abortion opinions across the 
electorate. MCs operate in a similar environment of limited information on 
attitudes and the intensity of those attitudes within their districts. 
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Research Strategy 
This analysis is focused on abortion policy voting in the 110th Senate (2007-2008). 
The selection of cases for this chapter is more straight forward than used in 
Chapter Three, as there were only four votes containing the word “abortion” in 
their description for the 110th Senate. The hypotheses here are similar to the 
analysis in Chapter Three and Four. Ideological considerations may feature 
within votes, but measures of district political culture and subconstituencies can 
impact salient issue voting within Congress. 
 The dependent variable of interests will be pro-life voting choices on four 
amendments that contained the word “abortion” in the legislative summary of 
the vote. An additional model using the sum of the number of pro-life votes is 
also analyzed using a Maximum Likelihood Poisson model, appropriate for 
count data. The combination specific issue votes and a view of the sample of the 
roll call record provided by the 110th Senate allows for a discussion of both 
individual voting and broader policy themes. The roll call record on issues like 
abortion may be conflated by two different dynamics. There may be strategic 
reasons to avoid a recorded roll call on a specific vote (Lynch and Madonna 
2013), yet Oldmixon (2005) reports that floor leaders are pressured by the 
intensity of some legislators who demand votes on issues (67).  
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 The independent variables in these models come from state-level 
measures. The first independent variable of interest is the average vote for the 
Republican presidential candidate over the 2000, 2004 and 2008 elections. This 
variable represents the median voter pull for each state; it also reflects the 
electoral safety and partisan strength of the states that may factor in a Senators 
voting calculus. A control variable for education levels in the state, a factor 
Gilens (2009) argues may be an important factor in public opinion on abortion, is 
included. 
 As in the immigration models presented in Chapter Three, this analysis 
considers the role of traditionalistic state political cultures. While “moralistic” 
cultures might seem like a more natural fit for questions like abortion, 
traditionalistic cultures are the ones that value maintaining the existing moral 
structure and on “paternalism” (Elazar 1994, 235). 
 A final variable of interest for this model is a measure for the activity of 
abortion protestors within a state. If, as Arnold argues, Senators value the known 
preferences of attentive publics, an active direct action branch of the abortion 
movement may be a sign that any action or vote on abortion policy will be notice, 
and may feature as an issue in future electoral politics. The logic here is similar to 
that of Chapter Four, where the attitude of attentive primary voters may feature 
more prominently in the decision calculus of legislators. To measure the activity 
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of these groups, I utilize a measure provided by the Guttmacher institute (Jerman 
and Jones 2014) that provides the percentage of abortion clinics within a state 
that reported 20 or more protest acts in the previous year. The results of the 
models are presented in Table 5.1.  
Brownback Amendments: International Grants and the “Mexico City Policy” 
Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS) provided two amendments regarding limits on 
grants to international organizations. These two amendments were for HR 2764, 
the appropriations bill for the State Department and other foreign operations. 
The first amendment was the least restrictive on grant activity, and was a 
requirement that no funds will go to organizations that conduct forced abortions 
or sterilizations. An obvious target to such an act was any family planning NGO 
or IGO working within China, whose “One Child Policy” might require groups 
to engage in behavior that could be related to abortion. But Senator Leahy (D-VT) 
argued against the bill, enacting this amendment would mean that the United 
States could not give grants to the United Nations Fund for Population Activities 
(UNFPA) (153 Cong. Rec. S11181; 2007). By a 48 to 45 vote, the Brownback 
amendment was adopted. 
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Table 5.1: Models of Abortion Voting in 110th Senate 
 
 Brownback I 
(Logit)  
Brownback II 
(Logit) 
Vitter  
(Logit)  
Ensign 
(Logit) 
All Votes 
(Poisson) 
(Intercept) 
 
-12.763* 
(3.510) 
 
-11.087* 
(3.279) 
-14.036* 
(3.666) 
-10.755* 
(3.374) 
-4.803* 
(1.068) 
Traditionalistic 
Political Culture 
 
1.405+ 
(0.752) 
1.593* 
(0.692) 
2.317* 
(0.777) 
0.930 
(0.720) 
0.660* 
(0.195) 
Pro-Life Direct 
Action 
 
0.022+ 
(0.013) 
0.011 
(0.012) 
 
0.005 
(0.012) 
0.013 
(0.066) 
0.006+ 
(0.003) 
B.A. Degree Holders 
 
0.153 
(0.121) 
0.162 
(0.119) 
0.304* 
(0.133) 
0.066 
(0.121 
0.068+ 
(0.040) 
 
Average GOP 
Presidential Vote   
 
17.146* 
(4.532) 
13.418* 
(3.962) 
14.363* 
(4.120) 
17.344* 
(4.368) 
6.915* 
(1.153) 
N 83 84 84 88 85 
Model 𝜒2 38.532* 29.404* 33.313* 39.176* 65.920* 
*Note: Standard Errors in parentheses, + = p ≤ 0.1; * = p ≤ 0.05. Vote totals are not equal to 100 due to 
missing values for protest data in MA, MS, SC, and WY. Additionally, Sens. Obama, Clinton, McCain, and 
Biden missed 3 to 4 votes due to the 2008 presidential campaign. Finally, Sen. Craig (R-ID) missed these 
votes due to scandal. 
 
 As the first model in Table 5.1 demonstrates, the variables for political 
culture and electoral strength of the Republican Party were significant in the 
models. The measure for pro-life direct action was only significant at the less 
restrained level (actual value p = 0.0867). Using one-tailed significance test, this 
value would be above the critical value. There should be little doubt as to the 
directional hypotheses if direct action activity, so other researchers may be 
willing to comfortably report this finding. Perhaps the clearest way to state the 
uncertainty seen in this result is that, in 1:10 cases, we might expect the effect of 
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the direct-action branch to be zero, and as such the null hypothesis of no 
influence cannot be rejected.   
 The second Brownback amendment to the State Department and foreign 
assistance appropriation act was similarly targeted at grantees who may receive 
funds and use them on abortion related procedures. This vote contributes to an 
ongoing debate on what has come to be known as the “Mexico City Policy.” The 
Brownback amendment would solidify this policy and prevent grants from 
reaching groups in any way involved with abortion, including most NGOs who 
distribute contraception. In the first days of the George W. Bush administration, 
this policy was put into law by Executive Order, an action Sen. Leahy described 
as unnecessary due to existing restrictions on grants to abortion groups, it was in 
his mind, “settled policy” (153 Cong. Rec. S11192; 2007). Leahy, even as one of the 
longest serving Senators of the time remarked: 
The Mexico City policy has been the subject of more political posturing, 
more press releases, more fundraising letters, more debates, more votes, 
and more Presidential vetoes, than virtually any other issue I can think of 
(Ibid). 
 
Leahy’s argument here is the exact logic surrounding issue politics that this 
research proposes is unaccounted for in the ideology alone. Again, in this model 
the electoral considerations of party politics show the most observed influence 
on vote choice. Even controlling for the average Republican vote share and 
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education achievement within a state, the variable for traditionalistic political 
culture showed statistical significance. The amendment was rejected, 41 to 53. 
Vitter Amendment: The Domestic Politics of Grants 
As Ainsworth and Hall noted, the roll call voting on abortion policies are most 
likely to be incremental proposals, rather than constitutional amendment or large 
scale policy changes. The Brownback amendments and the Vitter amendment 
considered here represent the type of small-scale changes that allow MCs the 
opportunity for advertising and position taking with minimized risk. In both 
cases, they offer “gag rule” or funding restrictions that, ostensibly, are meant to 
prevent taxpayer funds from reaching certain groups engaged in contraceptive 
or abortion services. In the case of this amendment, Vitter is introducing his own 
amendment that would prevent any money from reaching groups that are any 
way involved in abortion services. This amendment is aimed at groups like 
Planned Parenthood International that are engaged in abortion services as part of 
a larger portfolio of women’s health and reproductive activities. Senator Vitter 
introduced this amendment as part of consideration of HR3043, the 
appropriations bill for the Departments of Labor, HHS and Education.  
 Vitter makes a short case, similar to Brownback’s arguments and other 
funding related arguments on abortion policies. The senator then asks to 
introduces letters from both the Family Research Council and the Concerned 
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Women for America noting that this vote will be placed on their scorecard and 
advertised (153 Cong. Rec. S13060, 2007). 
 Senators Patty Murray (D-WA) and Barbara Boxer (D-CA) took to the 
floor to speak against the Vitter amendment. Boxer recalled that it was George 
W. Bush’s grandparents who started the Planned Parenthood organization in 
Connecticut and took the libertarian stance saying that the amendment was “‘Big 
Brother’ at its very worst” (Ibid.). Senator Murray reflected on the long-standing 
Hyde Amendment’s prohibition on the direct funding of abortion.  
 In Ainsworth and Hall’s model, passage in their model requires large 
coalitions to guard against political risk. In this case, the defunding of a largely 
respected group like Planned Parenthood could be a problematic electoral move 
in many states. The model reflects that states with traditionalistic cultures and 
high average support for republicans were the likely supporters of the Vitter 
Amendment. Senators from those states may wish to have good ratings from the 
Family Research Council and related groups. In fact, in Vitter’s home state of 
Louisiana, Governor Bobby Jindal has appointed the vocal leader of the Family 
Research Council Tony Perkins to important state boards.  
It may be more accurate to reverse this discussion and that and say that in 
non-traditionalistic states with low margins of GOP support, support for the Vitter 
proposal was unlikely. Given the problems that some Republicans have had 
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discussing abortion policies in recent elections, Senators like Richard Lugar (R-
IN) and Kit Bond (R-MO) may wish to be seen as less rigid on the issue than 
Senators like Brownback and Vitter, who try to take ownership of their position 
on abortion and incorporate it into their electoral enterprise. 
Ensign Amendment: Issue Ownership and Symbolic Activity 
As in the case of Sens. Vitter and Brownback, John Ensign (R-NV) made anti-
abortion advocacy a foundation of his image and enterprise. Like Henry Hyde 
(Loomis 1990, 62; Warwo 2000) or Rep. Jim Oberstar’s legislative activity on 
abortion activity, many MCs attempt to develop a reputation for issue advocacy 
and ownership. The Ensign amendment discussed here is an example of this type 
of issue ownership, however probably of a less policy-centered viewpoint. On 
this amendment, Sen. Ensign was attempting to secure funding for enforcing the 
“Child Custody Protection Act” that provided strict criminal penalties and 
funding for law enforcement to investigate possible movement of minors in 
search of abortion. The Ensign Amendment shifted 50 million dollars to fund the 
program as part of the funding package in SJ Res 70. The key problem with this 
proposal was that the Child Custody Protection Act was not, and was not likely 
to be law, a tactic that Sen. Boxer described as something out of “Alice in 
Wonderland” (154 Cong. Rec. S2070, 2008).  
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In a 49 to 49 vote, the amendment was rejected. As the model shows, the 
only variable of interest shown to be statistically significant is the variable for 
state Republican Party support. This amendment was brought to the Senate floor 
during consideration of a series of appropriations related amendments and the 
votes, many of which showed a similarly divided Senate. While many 
amendment votes on this same day dealt with billions of dollars in 
appropriations, massive changes to the estate tax code or other policy options, 
this was largely a symbolic vote.  
This bill was funding a program that did not exist and would likely not be 
passed by the Senate and House before the Presidential election and end the 
Congress, only months away. Its purpose, it appears, was to force Senators to 
take a position on a long-standing policy issue. During the 109th Congress, 
Senator Ensign introduced the same bill, successfully passed the bill through two 
committees, though it eventually died.8 After the initial Senate vote, Sen. Ensign 
and then Leader Bill Frist (R-TN) took to a press conference with the head of the 
Susan B. Anthony’s List, a pro-life interest group fashioned after Emily’s List, to 
push for public support to get the bill through conference. In this way, you can 
imagine Sen. Ensign incorporating a previous policy proposal into the discussion 
of SJ Res 70 to allow for future advertising opportunities like he had been given 
in the previous Congress. One can only assume that Ensign knew the struggles it 
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would take to pass both the legislation and this funding amendment, and was 
largely seeking to enhance an existing legislative reputation and enterprise. 
Conclusion: Advocates, Culture and Electoral Incentives 
Senators must balance the competing concerned of engaged publics with known 
concerns and unengaged publics with potential preferences. As outlined in 
Chapter Three, the distribution of political cultures and economic interests across 
the US makes each MCs own calculus unique, but it is unlikely to be only 
influenced by their own ideology on a single dimension. Chapter Four outlined 
how these separate constituencies and influence may impact MCs in their 
environmental voting. Republican MCs with the least conservative primary 
constituencies were shown to support environmental voting well beyond the 
mean Republican LCV score. Similarly, Democratic legislators were shown to be 
have environmental voting records that tracked with their district’s support for 
John Kerry in the 2004 presidential election. 
 This chapter extends this model of vote influence to consider abortion 
policy voting in the Senate and shows a similar influence for activists, here 
measured by protest activities at clinics within a state, even controlling for other 
important district factors. In both the individual vote case studies and the overall 
count model in the fifth column of Table 5.1, traditionalistic political culture has 
a statistically significant impact on abortion voting decisions. As hypothesized, 
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in these traditionalistic states, mostly in the South or near-south, a culture of 
respect for the moral and social status quo has guided legislators to consider how 
the publics in their state might view their vote choices if they became a campaign 
issue.  
In all cases the partisan support in a state was correlated with vote choice 
on these issues. The simplest explanation for this might be that more republicans 
mean more support for anti-abortion policies due to state conservatism. One 
might also argue that electoral security factors into this equation. Legislators are 
known to “uptake” issues that opponents might seek use against them in future 
campaigns (Sulkin 2005). Democrats in Bush winning states like Nelson (D-NE) 
Casey (D-PA), who each voted for 4 of 5 amendments, may have a calculated 
interest in keeping abortion off of the policy consideration in subsequent 
elections. This strategic perspective, rather than a fundamental personal 
ideology, may be influencing these policy decisions. 
Another key finding in this chapter came from the detailed analysis of the 
Congressional Record, including floor speeches and the introduction of letters from 
interest groups showing their intention of adding the vote to their scorecards. 
The strategic behavior in introducing amendments, as hypothesized by 
Ainsworth and Hall, lends support to the overall argument of this volume. 
Legislator’s floor behavior represents a host of factors, only some of which are 
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related to their own unidimensional ideology. In many cases, as was the case 
with immigration policy in the previous chapter, it is the most liberal legislators 
who argue against new government programs and spending. These issues 
simply do not fit nicely on a unidimensional scale, even in a polarized era. 
Further, state level variables measuring issue activism or primary extremism, 
state political culture and educational achievement have been shown to influence 
these votes independent of ideology. The picture painted here of abortion politics 
demonstrates the nuance to these votes when viewed from the Senate floor, 
rather than as part of the entire roll call record. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 118 
6 
 
 
Conclusion: Polarization, Ideology and Representation in the 
Modern Congress 
 
“What, if anything, are we doing at the present time to study the subject, 
and the activity, of congressional representation? Have we done enough? 
Have we done our best? And how, in particular, might we undertake 
some further analysis of the constituency-centric world in which, for a 
good part of their careers, all members of the US House of Representatives 
live, work and undergo scrutiny.” (Fenno 2013, 2)  
 
 
In February 7th of 2014, in the early days of the 103rd Congress’s second session, 
President Obama signed the Agriculture Act of 2014, or the “Farm Bill,” into law. 
The Farm Bill combined pieces of the Senate’s “Agriculture Reform, Food, and 
Jobs Act of 2013, ” the House’s “Federal Agriculture Reform and Risk 
Management Act of 2013,” the ”Oilheat Efficiency, Renewable Fuel Research and 
Jobs Training Act of 2014, ”  the “Chesapeake Bay Accountability and Recovery 
Act of 2013,” and the “Reducing Regulatory Burdens Act of 2013.” These 
separate bills were all germane to the Farm Bill’s overall goal of providing food, 
fuel and agricultural subsidies across the country and were combined into one 
omnibus package.   
 The case of Farm Bill legislation provides a textbook example of the 
dynamics of issue politics in a polarized setting covered in this volume. First, the 
benefits of the Farm Bill vary from state to state in important ways. All states get 
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some money, because food stamp or SNAP program recieves its funding through 
the passage of the bill. But due to population differences across states, variations 
in the poverty levels and state implementation of the SNAP program, and the 
industries and crops centered around each district or state, the differences in 
dollars received per constituent could vary greatly. In short, the economic 
benefits of the legislation are unequally dispersed. 
 Models of vote choice, like the ones used in earlier chapters, demonstrate 
how the choices of legislators vary by district economic interest. Here, we use the 
Senate votes on cloture, and on adopting the conference report. The vote on 
cloture passed the Senate 72-22, with 6 senators not voting, and the conference 
measure passed 68-32, with all senators voting. In the models presented below, 
the first dimension NOMINATE score is included as a measure of the liberal-
conservative ideology of the senator. The voteshare for Obama in 2012 is 
included to measure the influence state partisan support. Including both the 
NOMINATE and Obama voteshare is troublesome in these models due to the 
correlation between the two variables, however an additional model with both 
variables is found in Table 6.2 below. Finally, measures for the economic 
incentives surrounding the Farm Bill are added to the logit models. The first 
independent variable is a measure of possible SNAP users, which is simly the 
mean income for the state. A measure of state employment, by percentage, as 
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result of agriculture, forestry or fishing is included. In all cases where the 
multicollinarity resulting from inclusion of both ideology variables does not 
inflate the standard errors, the agriculture variable is significant. In addition, in 
the adoption of the conference report shows an influence for income levels, and 
therefore possible SNAP consumers, on vote choice on these issues.  
Table 6.1: Logit Models for Senate Votes on the HR2642: 
“The Agriculture Reform, Food and Jobs Act of 2013” 
 
 Cloture Cloture II Cloture  
III 
Conference 
Report 
C.R.  
II 
C.R.  
III 
Intercept 
 
 
5.504* 
(2.662) 
-3.765+ 
(2.034) 
8.213* 
(3.722) 
-6.073* 
(2.116) 
 
-0.963 
(1.719) 
9.460* 
(3.151) 
NOMINATE 
 
 
-4.863* 
(1.198) 
----- -5.648* 
(1.446) 
-3.750* 
(0.884) 
 
----- -4.736* 
(1.151) 
 
Obama ’12 
Voteshare 
 
----- 0.093* 
(0.038) 
-0.060 
(0.054) 
----- 0.065* 
(0.033) 
-0.073+ 
(0.047) 
Mean  
Income 
 
-0.085 
(0.048) 
-0.008 
(0.036) 
-0.076 
(0.049) 
-0.107* 
(0.038) 
 
0.041 
(0.030) 
 
-0.098* 
(0.039) 
% Employed in 
Agriculture, 
Fishing or 
Forestry 
0.403* 
(0.177) 
0.376* 
(0.166) 
0.299 
(0.195) 
0.249* 
(0.120) 
0.280* 
(0.130) 
0.168 
(0.139) 
N 94 94 94 100 100 100 
Model 𝜒2 -35.324* 10.238* -36.567* 31.210* 6.873 33.705*  
 
 In conducting this analysis, a search was made for other roll calls on the 
Farm Bill that might be interesting comparisons of ideological and constituency 
interests, or any related votes. Yet only five roll call votes were conducted on the 
legislation, the two you see in Table 6.1 and three in the house. The House of 
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Represenatives voted on passage, to instruct confrencees, and to adopt the 
conference report. In short, there were no “issue votes” to consider. Rather the 
specifics of the eventual policy were crafted in committees, either original 
standing committees or the conference committee.  
 An examination of votes, both recorded roll calls and voice votes, on the 
previous Farm Bills since 1980 shows the decline of recorded voting over time. 
Recorded votes have their advantages for MCs, they allow for position taking, 
facilitate advertising and can force political opponents to make difficult choices. 
But for a party leader attempting to maintain a majority, these votes can lead to 
intra-party divisions and may prevent the legislation from moving forward. In 
addition, as discussed in the previous chapter, MCs must consider the various 
constituencies and subconstituencies that may support a Farm Bill.  
The grants and subsidies created by the Farm Bill are not dispersed across 
the United States in the same way that they are not evenly dispersed within 
states. The case of the Kansas Senate delegation is illustrative on this point. 
Senior Kansas Senator Pat Roberts, who will serve as the Chair of the Agriculture 
Committee in the 114th Congress, cast a vote against the Farm Bill, citing its 
“burdensome regulations,” “government subsidies,” and “unneeded give-a-
ways to state government” as the reason for his vote (Kraske 2014). Yet the junior 
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Figure 6.1: Roll Call and Voice Votes on “Farm Bill” Legislation 
 
 
 
senator from the state, Jerry Moran voted for the bill and though he describes it 
as “not ideal” he stated its benefits for Kansas farmers and ranchers (Roberts 
2014). Roberts and Moran have a difference in first dimension ideology of 0.012, 
with Moran being more conservative at 0.431 to Roberts 0.419. They share the 
same constituency as well. As the more liberal senator and member of the Senate 
Agriculture committee, many would assume Roberts to be a member of the 
coalition supporting the legislation. 
 If their constituency characteristics and ideology did not differ, perhaps 
the largest difference between the two candidates was Robert’s impending 
primary election. Just four weeks after the vote, Public Policy Polling (PPP) 
conducted a poll of 365 GOP primary voters in Kansas and discovered that “very 
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conservative” Republican primary voters (32% of total polled) would prefer a 
candidate more conservative than Roberts at a margin of 62-26%. Among 
“conservative” primary voters (also 32% of the poll) the margin was 44-41%, 
within the margin of error but a coin toss or slight edge in favor of a more 
conservative candidate (Public Policy Polling 2014).  
While Roberts would face a conservative primary challenge in August, 
less than eight months away, Senator Moran would not face an electoral 
opponent until the 2016 cycle. Roberts had to make a choice between a very 
conservative primary constituency who was threatening his long-held Senate 
seat, and the agriculture community of Kansas who he had represented on the 
Agriculture Committee in the Senate, and as Chairperson of the House 
Agricultural Committee in the Farm Bill passed in the 104th Congress. Poole and 
Rosenthal argue: “contemporary members of Congress do not adapt their 
positions during their careers, but simply enter and maintain a fixed position 
until they die, retire, or are defeated in their ideologial boots” and “not only do 
they die with their ideological boots on, they don’t change them when they run 
for Senate (2007; 97, 100).” Yet on this important issue, both for his committee 
and his state, Roberts reversed years of support for the Farm Bill as chair of the 
House committee and as a member of the Senate committee.  
 
 124 
The Utility of NOMINATE Scores 
Many of the arguments in this volume have been against the ideological model 
of voting, most commonly represented in the work of Poole and Rosenthal, 
among others. Yet this criticism or critique of the overuse should not be 
construed to suggest that it is useless, or should not be used. The model of 
congressional decisionmaking highlighted in this research, is not unlike the work 
of Fenno, Kingdon, or others who describe the nuanced voting calculus that MCs 
must undergo. Other scholars of Congress, namely Mayhew’s (1974) electoral 
incentive, Krehbeil or Tsebelis’ (1988; 2002) veto-pivots, or Poole and Rosenthal’s 
“ideological boots,” all provide elegant models of what is obviously a complex 
process.  The research in these pages is not a simple theory, or an overall theory 
of legislative activity at all, and only seeks to qualify or challenge certain 
components of other dominant theories. 
The ideological model allows for a single concept and structure to account 
for the entirerty of the roll call history in Congress, a contribution that has 
impacted the research efforts in numerous ways. Creating NOMINATE data has 
allowed scholars of Congress to do things that were really not possible in earlier 
periods. Measurement of the ideological distance, both within and between 
parties, is now possible. We can rank members of each house in order, 
determining who has displayed the most extreme and moderate voting 
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behaviors over their careers. We can now compare, side by side, the ideology of 
Davy Crockett (20th Congress, 1867) and Sonny Bono (104th, 1995); Sonny is more 
conservative at 0.389 to Crockett’s moderate 0.054. So it is not just that this data 
allows us to answer questions previously impossible, we can now consider 
questions that were previously inconcievable.  
 Yet as a first-principle approach to understanding the institution, the 
ideological model has some downfalls. Unlike Mayhew’s landmark work 
surrounding electoral incentives, the ideological model has little to say about the 
creation of the institution rules or the many other activities that MCs engage in 
outside of roll call voting. As the Fenno quote that began this chapter noted, little 
is done within the field of congressional studies that examines fundamental 
theoretical questions of representaion, or on the personal nature of the 
congressional enterprise. The view from one vote, one member, or one 
committee provides a much more complex, and perhaps more realistic, picture 
than the view of tens of thousands of MCs or thousands of roll call votes.  Both 
approaches should be given attention as the subfield develops further. 
Looking Forward: “Herestetics,” Dimensionality and Gridlock in Congress 
What does this research tell us about the future of Congress? While this analysis 
was not meant to be a general theory of voting, or a prediction for the future, 
there are implications for the arguments made here. As this chapter asserted, the 
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decreasing use of roll call voting for final passage and other votes should be 
expected to decrease (see also Lynch and Madonna 2013). Political scientists have 
long noted the importance of manipulating the scope of conflict to achieve 
political goals (Schattschneider 1960). As such, the prevalence of “gangs” may 
increase. Major policies may be crafted by a “gang of eight” or “gang of thirteen” 
rather than in an open committee process or through amendments on the floor 
through roll call voting. Using “gangs” will allow members with electoral saftey, 
either from years of service or from moderate electoral districts” to take credit for 
crafting compromise legislation, while MCs on the ideological extremes can 
distance themselves from the compromise. This dynamic of using voice votes or 
closed door compromises also allows members to avoid taking possibly risky 
votes or issue positions when unneccessary. 
 A second important implication of the finding in these chapters regarding 
the persistance of dimensionality is the increasing power of agenda control, and 
the increasing liklihood of gridlock. Riker’s (1986) The Art of Political Manipulation 
explores the idea of “herestetics” or political strategy, and makes a case for how 
adding an additional dimension to a consideration can change the underlying 
coalitions and conditions. If the modern Congress, even with its polarization, still 
contains extra dimensions of preferences, these dimensions can be exploited to 
create gridlock. Theoretically, two dimensions of preferences create “chaos” 
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(McKelvy 1976) and create an opportunity for floor leaders to craft an agenda to 
reach policy goals. In earlier periods of Congress, the second dimension was 
perhaps the most important dynamic. The 1808 clause in The Constituion and the 
successive compromises regarding slavery provide an example of how some 
dimensions are gagged to prohibit this stalemate. Yet if dimensions are only part 
of a story that is mainly about liberal-conservative, “big” v “small” government 
concerns, they may still be exploited. 
 Finally, this analysis has attempted to reach important questions about the 
nature of representation in Congress. The previous chapters have explored the 
representation of Latinos, primary voters, abortion advocates and of the general 
election constituency. On certain policy votes, we can see an impact for these 
groups. That is largely good news. But, as Arnold (1990) noted, inattentive and 
attentive publics may have different preferences, and the a reduced scope of 
conflict may create an upper-class bias (Schattschneider 1960). In a polarized era, 
with gerrymandered house districts and partisan state populations, we may 
expect MCs to depart from their own ideology in favor of their primary voters as 
Chapter Four and the case of Sen. Pat Roberts explored.  
Further Research 
As the quote from Fenno implored at the beginning of this chapter, 
understanding the concept of “representation” and its quality within the U.S. 
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Congress should be an important goal for legislative scholars. While many 
scholars would like the freedom to conduct research in the manner that Fenno 
and Kingdon have, the current state of research does not prioritize these 
descriptive findings, and publishing demands would not give most researchers 
the time. But if understanding representation is given value within quantitative 
studies of Congress and scholars are unafraid to make normative claims on the 
state of our democracy, the field and its students will be strengthened. 
 The policy categories listed here are obviously not the only regionally 
based issues that can impact what it is largely a unidimensional Congress. 
Further, issues like the biodiesel subsidies considered in Chapter Three may fade 
from view as others emerge. Research that examines the rise of new policy issues 
and the ideological content (or lack of content) may be important. Recent policy 
issues like government survailance, drones, or  net-neutrality have created 
coalitions of liberals and liberatarians and do not fit nicely on a single dimension.  
 Finally, students of history and public policy should join the discussion of 
institutionalists scholars of Congress to interpret the behavior, social dynamics, 
policy implications and historical significance of single votes. While the 
exploration of primary source material in this research lacked the depth of an 
historian’s analysis, making use of the Congressional Record, press releases, emails 
and tweets (an archive is now maintained at the Library of Congress) can be an 
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important avenue to exploring the concept of a represenative’s “Home Style” in 
the future. 
Conclusion: Understanding Issue Politics in a Polarized Congress 
Even in the polarized era of the modern Congress, diverse and dispersed cultural 
and economic interests interact with multiple principals to creat incentives for 
MCs to prioritize constituency-based concerns above their own ideology. 
Individual issue areas like environmental conservation, energy subsidies or 
immigration policy may be particularly salient in some areas of the US and not in 
others, and be prioritized by some groups and not others. The regularity of a 
single-dimensional voting structure with increasingly divided parties has 
dampened this dynamic, but is unlikely to silence it in a multi-cultural 
democracy.  
 Issues that create economic benefits for some regions at the expense of 
others may lead members of Congress to vote against their usual ideological 
viewpoints. The uneven layering of political cultures may have similar effects 
when considering issues like immigration and abortion. Even if the spread of 
these cultural or economic values is relativly similar across most districts, 
individual districts or states with ideological extreme primary voters or an active 
issue public may create additional competing incentives for MCs. These complex 
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interactions are unlikely to be satisfactorally explained with a one, or even two-
dimensional model of preferences.  
 The voting calculus of MCs continues to be an important topic of interest 
within the subfield of congressional studies. Questioning both the conventional 
wisdom of the layperson as well as the assumptions and interpretations of 
leading theories and theorists is an important part of the scientific process. In the 
natural sciences, physicists still operate based on the “Standard Model” that has 
not fully incorporated the gravitational ideas in Einstein’s general relativity. 
Social scientists cannot, and likely do not, expect a full and universal theory as 
physicist might. But by challenging the assumptions and unexplained 
observations created by a domiant perspective, the scholarly community as a 
whole can benefit. This work has attempted to ask questions and test a leading 
theory against alternate explanations. In signficant ways, the ideologists 
perspective on congressional voting is lacking. Yet even from a critical 
perspective, this confirms the major observations and expectations of the theory. 
As new research tools and statistical methods are incorporated into the field, the 
current perspective may be the Newton to a future Einstein. Moving forward, it 
is essential that research focuses on the personal and dynamic nature of 
legislative representation, rather than the birds-eye view of the institution that 
too often dominates contemporary congressional scholarship.  
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Endnotes
1 Portions of this chapter come from the author’s M.A. thesis at the University of Kansas 
“Dimensionality in Congressional Voting: The Role of Issues and Agendas” (2012).  
 
2 The 110th Senate had 16 women and 1 black member, the rest were white males. The 114th (2015-
2016) Congress will be 80% white, 80% male, and 92% Christian, earning it the label of “the most 
diverse Congress in history.” 
 
3 An over sample of competitive districts would have biased the results of the multivariate 
analysis. Most districts do not see competitive House elections. A total of 15 of the 100 districts in 
the random sample would be considered “competitive.” Due to missing values, the models 
contain 52 Republicans and 43-44 Democrats cases for analysis. 
 
4 Obviously, convention participants from both parties have strong partisan attachments. To 
correct for possible bias in the responses, informant responses were regressed using a party 
dummy variable. Subtracting that coefficient from the responses allows to adjust for the average 
partisan bias in each question, and approximate the measure that of an independent expert. 
   
5 “Primary Extremism” = |4 – (“incumbents party primary voter ideology; purged mean”) |; you 
can see this data graphically in Figure One. 
 
6 Stone’s survey also included a measure of general election ideology for each district. When this 
variable was used instead of the Kerry vote share measure the model showed nearly identical 
results, with no key variables changing in direction of impact or statistical significance.  
 
7 The simulation was conducted using the Zelig software package (Imai, King, and Lau 2007, 
2009). 100,000 cases were simulated to the same specifications as the first two models in Table 
One. The precision of the estimation is demonstrated by the presence of 95% confidence intervals. 
To plot the two groups, simulations were conducted on each of the ADA models separately. The 
range of observed values of the primary ideology variables was used to simulate ADA scores. 
Democrats observed values (0.05972-2.821); Republican observed values (0.964-2.843). 
 
8 109th Congress S. 403; Passed in the House as “Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act”, 
9/26/06; Passed in the Senate as “Child Custody Protection Act”, 7/25/06. 
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Appendix One: Public Institutions and Public Choice (PIPC) Topic Coding 
Topic/Variable Name PIPC Codes Content Examples 
Rural 200-209 
 
Agriculture Subsides, Farm Credit 
 
Energy & Environment 600-692 
 
Offshore Oil, Superfund, Nuclear Waste, 
Clean Air Act 
 
Civil Rights 720-739 
 
Criminal Procedures, Civil Rights Act, 
Busing 
 
Crime 751-769 
 
Drug Control,  Law Enforcement Assistance 
 
Agriculture 910-919 
 
Farm Labor, Production Controls, Price 
Supports 
 
Foreign Policy 400-499 
 
Foreign Aid, State Department, Human 
Rights, Sanctions 
 
Gun Control 750 
 
Gun Control 
Abortion 947-948 Family Planning, Abortion 
 
Baseline Issues Not Included: 
  
Symbolic 0-99 
 
Impeachment, Committees, Ethics 
Appropriations 100-199 
210-299 
 
All Appropriations Issue Codes except 
“Rural” appropriations (200-209) 
Defense 
 
300-399 NASA, Weapons Procurement, Intelligence 
Economy, Taxes and Budget 500-592 
 
Misc. Tax Policy, Foreign Trade, Financial 
Regulations, Debt, Budget Resolutions 
 
Government Operations, Civil 
Rights, Justice 
700-719 
740-740 
Government Benefits and Employee Pay 
Campaign Finance, FEC 
 770-779 
780-781 
 
Lobbying, Scandals (Watergate/Whitewater) 
Homeland Security 
Welfare and Human Services 800-869 
 
Social Security, HUD, Education 
Misc. Domestic 900-909 
920-939 
940-946 
950-959 
960-969 
970-999 
Federalism, Revenue Sharing 
Transportation, Women’s Issues 
Health and Human Services 
Arts and Public TV; NSF 
Labor Relations 
Consumer Issues, Misc. 
 
